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CHECKING IN ON "CHECK-THE-BOX"
Heather M Field*
Twelve years ago, new regulations dramatically changed the manner in
which the federal income tax system determines how business entities
are taxed. The new explicitly elective "check-the-box" regulations for
entity classification drew wide praise when they replaced the old multi-
factored corporate resemblance test. Now, with the benefit of hindsight
and with previously unpublished data regarding entity classification
elections made since 1997, this Article revisits the check-the-box
regulations. As the first comprehensive study of these regulations in
action, this Article critically examines the successes and failures of
arguably the most significant change to the business tax system in the
last twenty years. The Article argues that the experience with the
check-the-box regulations suggests that they fall short of their promise
even though they are an improvement over the prior entity classification
rules. The Article also examines the scope of the check-the-box election
itself and argues that the election lacks a coherent set of limitations,
which undermines the goals behind the provision of the election.
Ultimately, this Article concludes that the policy weaknesses revealed
by an examination of the check-the-box regulations stem fundamentally
from the existence of a multi-regime system for taxing businesses.
Hence, the regulations expose a problem with the business tax regimes
among which taxpayers can choose, thus adding an additional reason
to reform the federal income tax treatment of businesses.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine that you are starting a business with a few colleagues.
You learn that, in order to obtain favorable tax treatment for the
business, you are going to have to alter parts of your agreed-upon
business arrangement. Although you may be a little frustrated, you
think that favorable tax treatment for the business is important, so
you all agree to allow the tax rules to dictate some of your business
terms on issues such as how you and your colleagues will handle
management responsibilities, under what circumstances you or your
colleagues can sell interests in the business, what happens to the
business when one of you dies, and whether any of you will be
personally responsible for debts of the business. Given this situation,
how would you react if the tax rules were changed so that you could
keep all of the terms of your desired business arrangement without
interference from the tax rules and still obtain favorable tax
treatment for the business? If you are anything like the taxpayers
who were affected when the tax rules were actually changed in the
mid-1990s, you probably welcome the new "check-the-box" rules
enthusiastically, thinking that the change is practically a cure-all for
the business problems (and the headaches) that the old tax rules
created. However, this Article argues that the purported panacea
produced significant side effects, which call into question the
wisdom of both the new tax rules and the federal income tax's
overall approach to taxing businesses.
This dramatic change to the tax rules occurred a little more than
a decade ago, when the U.S. Treasury Department finalized new
regulations addressing how the federal income tax system determines
whether business entities are taxed as partnerships under Subchapter
K1 of the Internal Revenue Code' or as corporations under
Subchapter C3 of the Code. The new regulations,4 effective as of
January 1, 1997,' created an entity classification regime that is, in
large part, explicitly elective. Generally, domestic business entities
1. I.R.C. §§ 701-777 (2007).
2. Unless otherwise stated, all references to the "Code" and subchapters or sections thereof
refer to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended.
3. I.R.C. §§ 301-385 (2007). Except where specific reference is made to Subchapter S, this
Article treats all corporations as C corporations, taxed under Subchapter C of the Code.
4. Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-2,-3 (as amended by T.D. 8697, 1997-1 C.B. 215).
5. Simplification of Entity Classification Rules, 61 Fed. Reg. 66,584 (Dec. 18, 1996) (to be
codified at 26 C.F.R. pts. 1, 301, 602).
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incorporated under state or federal law and specifically enumerated
types of foreign business entities are taxed as corporations,6 but
almost any other business entity can elect its status for federal
income tax purposes. An unincorporated entity can choose to be
classified either as (1) an association taxable as a corporation, or (2)
a partnership (if the entity has two or more owners) or a disregarded
entity (if the entity has only one owner).' An unincorporated
business entity can make this entity classification election quite
easily by checking a box on a two-page form that is filed with the
Internal Revenue Service ("IRS" or "Service"). 8 Hence, these entity
classification regulations are commonly referred to as the "check-
the-box" regulations ("CTB regulations"). This explicitly elective
approach to entity classification differs markedly from the pre-check-
the-box classification regime, which depended on a multi-factored
analysis of the extent to which a business entity had corporate-like
characteristics. 9
As business and tax lawyers generally know, the tax
consequences to business entities and their owners can vary
considerably depending on the entity's classification as a partnership
or corporation. Entities classified as partnerships are afforded
conduit or pass-through treatment and are subject to only one level of
taxation.' °  In contrast, entities classified as corporations are
generally subject to double taxation-taxation at the corporate level
and taxation at the shareholder level." Although the impact of
double taxation was reduced when the tax rates on individuals'
capital gains and qualified dividends were lowered in 2003,12 and can
6. Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-2(b)(1), (8) (as amended in 2008).
7. Id. § 301.7701-3(a) (as amended in 2006). There are some limited exceptions to the
elective nature of entity classification. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 7704 (2008) (mandatorily taxing all
publicly traded partnerships as corporations, unless an exception applies); Treas. Reg. §
301.7701-2(b) (as amended in 2008) (mandatorily classifying certain types of business as
corporations). See also discussion infra Part IV.B.
8. Entity Classification Election, I.R.S. Form 8832 (rev. Mar. 2007).
9. 26 C.F.R. §§ 301.7701-1 to -3 (1993).
10. I.R.C. §§ 701-702 (2007) (providing that partners shall be taxed on their distributive
share of partnership income, but that partnerships themselves shall not be subject to income tax).
11. Id. §§ 11, 301 (imposing federal income tax on corporations, and taxing corporate
shareholders on distributions, respectively). This is the general treatment of corporations that are
subject to tax under Subchapter C of the Code. However, certain types of corporations, including
corporations that elect to be treated as Subchapter S corporations, may be subject to only one
level of taxation rather than two. See id. §§ 1361-1379.
12. Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, 117 Stat.
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also be mitigated through tax planning, 3 tax classification still
matters. Many tax and non-tax considerations factor into the choice
of entity, and much has been written (and countless hours have been
billed) analyzing whether businesses should use entities taxable as
corporations or entities taxable as partnerships. 4
Given the potential tax cost (and hence, monetary importance)
of the threshold question of whether a business entity is taxed as a
corporation or a partnership, we should look carefully at how the tax
law makes that initial determination. This is a productive time for
that inquiry because the validity of the CTB regulations was upheld
recently. 5 In addition, we can now reflect on over a decade's worth
of experience with the CTB regulations, spanning ups and downs in
the economy and important changes to the tax law, 6 among other
major developments. Accordingly, this Article, which is the first
comprehensive study of the CTB regulations in action, critically
examines the successes and failures of one of the most significant
changes to the business tax system, in an effort to determine what
lessons can be learned from more than ten years worth of experience
with the CTB regulations.
To provide background for this examination, Part II of this
Article traces the history of the entity classification rules, starting
with the multi-factored corporate resemblance test reflected in
Morrissey v. Commissioner7 and then in the pre-CTB "Kintner"
752, 758-64 (2003). The Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act of 2005 extended the
sunset date for these lowered rates until December 31, 2010. Pub. L. No. 109-222, 120 Stat. 345,
346 (2006).
13. For example, a corporation may be capitalized with a significant amount of debt, interest
payments on which are deductible. See I.R.C. § 163(a) (2009). See also John W. Lee, A Populist
Political Perspective of the Business Tax Entities Universe: "Hey the Stars Might Lie But the
Numbers Never Do ", 78 TEx. L. REv. 885 (2000) (suggesting that the conventional wisdom that
the "double tax" makes corporations a bad choice for small businesses is erroneous).
14. See, e.g., Darryll K. Jones & David Kirk, Choice of Entity Planning After JGTRRA:
Brainstorming the Triple Split, Bus. ENTITIES, Mar./Apr. 2004, at 1, 3-4; Leslie H. Loffman &
Sanford C. Presant, Choice of Entity-Business and Tax Considerations, in TENTH ANNUAL
REAL ESTATE TAx FORUM 307 (Tax Law and Estate Planning Course Handbook Series, No.
14248, 2008); Carol J. Miller et al., Limited Liability Companies Before and After the January
1997 IRS "Check-the-Box" Regulations: Choice of Entity and Taxation Considerations, 25 N.
KY. L. REV. 585 (1998).
15. Littriello v. United States, 484 F.3d 372 (6th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S.Ct. 1290
(2008).
16. E.g., Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-222, 120
Stat. 345, 346 (2006); Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-
27, 117 Stat. 752, 758-64 (2003).
17. 296 U.S. 344, 357-59 (1935).
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entity classification regulations. 8 Part II also explains the Treasury's
approach to classification of limited liability companies and provides
background regarding the adoption of the CTB regulations. As part
of this overview of the evolution of the entity classification rules,
Part II discusses both the policy rationale behind the mid-1990s
change to the entity classification regulations and the generally
positive public response to the adoption of the CTB regulations.
Part III of this Article evaluates the extent to which the CTB
regulations, as applied over the last decade, accomplish the policy
goals behind their adoption. Accordingly, Part III examines issues of
simplicity, administrability, certainty, transaction costs, efficiency,
and equity, among others. In addition, Part III analyzes how the
CTB regulations allow for greater flexibility in structuring and
operating businesses, focusing on the role of the CTB regulations in
the increasing popularity of limited liability companies. Further, Part
III discusses the impact of the CTB regulations on the
implementation of business transactions, both in domestic and cross-
border contexts. That discussion notes that the CTB regulations
allow for the increased flexibility in structuring business transactions
such as corporate reorganizations, but that discussion also
acknowledges that a number of scholars have identified difficulties
(and potential abuses) when the CTB regulations apply in the
international context. 9 Part III also inquires into the fiscal and
systemic impacts of the CTB regulations' explicitly elective entity
classification system. This analysis is informed by unpublished data
regarding CTB elections made since 1997.2o All of this analysis will
be undertaken assuming that the federal income tax system retains
multiple different regimes for taxing businesses, where C
corporations continue to be subject to two levels of taxation and
partnerships continue to be subject to only one.
18. 26 C.F.R. § 301.7701-2(a) (1960). The Kintner regulations, which were promulgated in
response to the decision in United States v. Kintner, 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954), made it
somewhat more difficult for business to qualify as an association taxable as a corporation. See
infra Part II.A.
19. See, e.g., Peter H. Blessing et al., Report of the Task Force on International Tax Reform,
59 TAX LAW. 649, 736-46 (2006); Lawrence Lokken, Whatever Happened to Subpart F? U.S.
CFC Legislation After the Check-the-Box Regulations, 7 FLA. TAX REv. 185, 194-202 (2005).
See also discussion infra Part III.D.
20. This data was provided by the I.R.S. Statistics on Income Division. See infra note 110
(describing the data) and Appendix A (providing graphical representations of the data).
456
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Part IV of this Article approaches the CTB regulations from a
different perspective, asking what the CTB election itself reveals
about the propriety of using an explicitly elective entity classification
system. Part IV asks why taxpayers should be allowed to choose
their tax treatment and argues that, for the tax law's provision of an
explicit choice to be appropriate, the scope of that choice and the
limitations on a taxpayer's ability to make that choice must be
defensible, at the very least. Then, Part IV evaluates the limitations
on the availability of the CTB election and concludes that while
some limitations are justifiable, it is much more difficult to explain
why entities that are incorporated under state or federal statutes and
entities that are publicly traded partnerships should not be able to
choose their entity classification. Part IV argues that the lack of a
coherent set of limitations on the CTB election undermines the
provision of the explicit entity classification election, suggesting the
need for modification.
Part V reflects on the implications of the foregoing analysis on
the manner in which the federal income tax system taxes businesses.
Part V concludes that the policy weaknesses revealed by a close
examination of the CTB regulations stem primarily from the
existence of a multi-regime system for taxing businesses. Although
this multi-regime system for taxing businesses ironically may have
been entrenched by the promulgation of the regulations, this Article
ultimately concludes that the CTB regulations, which provide many
entities with a choice of applicable business tax regime, expose a
problem with the choices themselves, thus adding an additional
reason to reform the federal income tax's treatment of businesses.
II. EVOLUTION OF THE ENTITY CLASSIFICATION REGULATIONS
Businesses that are corporations by virtue of the fact that they
are formed under, and operate pursuant to, state incorporation law
are (and have historically been) classified as corporations for federal
income tax purposes." However, for tax purposes, the term
21. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(1) (as amended in 2008); Stephen B. Scallen, Federal
Income Taxation of Professional Associations and Corporations, 49 MINN. L. REV. 603, 625
(1965) ("No case has been found holding that a business organized under a state corporation law,
calling itself a corporation, and actually operating under that form, should be characterized other
than as a corporation for federal income tax purposes."). One major exception to this was the
treatment of professional service corporations, which the Service tried to exclude from being
taxed as corporations. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(c) (as amended by T.D. 6797, 1965-1 C.B.
553). After the courts invalidated the regulations' treatment of professional corporations, the
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"corporation" includes more than just these incorporated businesses;
since at least the early 1920s, the term "corporation" also included
"associations, joint-stock companies, and insurance companies. 22
Accordingly, there has been a need to determine which
unincorporated entities are "associations" and hence are taxable as
corporations. The manner for making this determination has varied
over time.
A. The Corporate Resemblance Test
Prior to the CTB regulations, the classification of a business
entity as a corporation, on one hand, or a partnership or trust, on the
other hand, depended on the extent to which the entity resembled a
corporation.23 Morrissey v. Commissioner,24 which was decided in
1935 and was generally regarded as the "leading Supreme Court case
on the issue of what is an association,"25 explained that the key issue
was "resemblance": "The resemblance points to features
distinguishing associations from partnerships as well as from
ordinary trusts. '26  In explaining the resemblance test, the Court
articulated which features make an entity that has associates, 27 "when
created and maintained as a medium for the carrying on of a business
enterprise and sharing its gains[,] . . analogous to a corporate
organization .... 28 Specifically, the Court in Morrissey focused on
the following corporate-like features: "title to the property embarked
in the corporate undertaking, 29 centralized management,30 continuity
of life,3' transferability of interests,32 and limited liability.33
Service issued Revenue Ruling 70-101, 1970-1 C.B. 278, conceding that professional
corporations would be treated as associations taxable as corporations. See generally Patrick E.
Hobbs, Entity Classification: The One Hundred-Year Debate, 44 CATH. U. L. REV. 437, 487-91
(1995) (providing a more detailed discussion of the classification issues for professional
corporations). But see infra Part IV.B.4 (questioning why incorporated entities are denied a
choice of tax classification).
22. I.R.C. § 7701(a)(3) (2008); Morrissey v. Comm'r, 296 U.S. 344, 349 (1935) (citing the
statutory language from the Revenue Acts of 1924 and 1926 defining the term "corporation").
23. See generally Hobbs, supra note 21; Scallen, supra note 21 (both providing a detailed
history of entity classification rules).
24. 296 U.S. 344.
25. Scallen, supra note 21, at 628; see also Hobbs, supra note 21, at 478 n.232.
26. Morrissey, 296 U.S. at 357.
27. Id. at 356 ("'Association' implies associates.").
28. Id. at 359.
29. Id.
30. Id. ("Corporate organization furnishes the opportunity for a centralized management
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It was clear from Morrissey and subsequent court decisions
applying the Morrissey corporate resemblance test that an entity need
not have all of these corporate-like features for the entity to be
classified as an association. Rather, an entity created and maintained
to carry on a business enterprise and to share its gains would be
treated as an association if it, on balance, closely resembled a
corporation, taking into account the features listed in Morrissey.34
The IRS encountered some difficulty with the Morrissey
corporate resemblance test almost two decades later, in Kintner v.
United States," when the Court applied the Morrissey factors to a
medical association formed by a group of doctors. The doctors,
hoping to be able to establish a tax-favored pension plan (available to
entities taxed as corporations but not to entities taxed as
partnerships), argued that the features of their medical organization
enabled the organization to be classified as an association taxable as
a corporation under Morrissey.36 Although the government, contrary
to its typical position in association cases,37 argued that the medical
organization in Kintner should not be treated as an "association,"38
the federal district court concluded that the medical organization
satisfied the corporate resemblance test and should be treated as an
association taxable as a corporation.39
Dissatisfied with the court's decision in Kintner, the Service
issued Revenue Ruling 56-23,4" disavowing any precedential effect
of the Kintner decision. Although the revenue ruling was rescinded
the next year,4 the Service issued a new set of entity classification
through representatives of the members of the corporation.").
3 1. Id. (Corporate organizations are "secure from termination or interruption by the death of
owners of beneficial interests .... ).
32. Id. (Corporate organization allows for "the transfer of beneficial interests without
affecting the continuity of the enterprise .... ").
33. Id. (Corporate organization "permits the limitation of the personal liability of
participants to the property embarked in the undertaking.").
34. See, e.g., Bert v. Helvering, 92 F.2d 491, 493-96 (D.C. Cir. 1937); Kintner v. U.S., 107
F. Supp. 976, 979 (D. Mont. 1952) [hereinafter Kintner I], ajfd, 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954).
35. Kintnerl, 107 F. Supp. at 979.
36. See id. at 977-78.
37. See, e.g., Pelton v. Comm'r, 82 F.2d 473 (7th Cir. 1936).
38. See Kintner l, 107 F. Supp at 978.
39. See id. at 979-80.
40. 1956-1 C.B. 598.
41. Rev. Rul. 57-546, 1957-2 C.B. 886.
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regulations in 1960 to try to make it harder to achieve association
status under the corporate resemblance test.42 Commonly referred to
as the "Kintner regulations," the new entity classification regulations
identified six major characteristics of corporations: "(i) associates,
(ii) an objective to carry on a business and divide the gains
therefrom, (iii) continuity of life, (iv) centralization of management,
(v) liability for corporate debts limited to corporate property, and (vi)
free transferability of interests. 43 Under the Kintner regulations, an
entity that had more corporate characteristics than noncorporate
characteristics would be treated as an association taxable as a
corporation.4 In making this determination, characteristics common
to corporate and noncorporate entities were disregarded, meaning
that for business entities, the resemblance test was based on just the
last four characteristics.45 This revised formulation of the corporate
resemblance test made it more difficult for entities like general
partnerships to be treated as associations because the regulations
deemed them unable to possess a majority of the corporate
characteristics. 46  Although the Kintner regulations reflected a
somewhat narrower formulation of the corporate resemblance test
than was articulated in Morrissey, the determination of whether an
unincorporated entity was classified as an "association" continued to
depend on the extent to which the entity had corporate-like features.
The revised corporate resemblance test, embodied in the Kintner
regulations, faced a new challenge beginning in the late 1970s with
the development of limited liability companies ("LLCs"). In 1977,
in an effort to develop a vehicle that provided owners corporate-like
protection from liability for the entity's debts while attempting to
achieve pass-through tax treatment under the Kintner regulations,47
the Wyoming legislature enacted the country's first legislation
authorizing LLCs. 48 LLCs combined very desirable characteristics-
42. 26 C.F.R. § 301.7701-2(a)(1) (1960).
43. Id.
44. Id. §§ 301.7701-2(a)(2) to (3).
45. Id.
46. Id. §§ 301.7701-2(b)(2) (general partnership cannot have continuity of life), -2(c)(4)
(general partnership cannot have centralized management), -2(d)(1) (1960) (general partnership
cannot have limited liability).
47. See Susan Pace Hamill, The Story of LLCs: Combining the Best Features of a Flawed
Business Tax Structure, in BUSINESS TAX STORIES 295, 295-98 (Steven A. Bank & Kirk J. Stark
eds., 2005) [hereinafter Hamill, Story of LLCs].
48. Wyoming Limited Liability Company Act, ch. 158, 1977 Wyo. Sess. Laws 577.
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"limited liability for all members, partnership features such as
dissolution at will and lack of free transferability, and members'
ability to participate in control without risking loss of their limited
liability."49 The creation of this new type of entity required the IRS
to analyze how it would be classified for federal income tax
purposes. The IRS addressed this question in Private Letter Ruling
81-06-082 (Nov. 18, 1980), concluding that under the Kintner
regulations, a particular Wyoming LLC would be classified as a
partnership, and not as an association taxable as a corporation,
because the LLC lacked the corporate characteristics of continuity of
life and free transferability of interests." Although the Service
admitted that the Wyoming LLC would be treated as a partnership
under the existing regulations, the Service was dissatisfied with that
result and, contemporaneously with the Private Letter Ruling, issued
proposed regulations that "provide[d] that an organization in which
no member has personal liability for the debts of the organization be
classified as an association taxable as a corporation."'" These
proposed regulations would have changed the tax classification of
Wyoming LLCs, causing them to be treated as associations taxable
as corporations. 2 In 1983, the IRS withdrew these proposed
regulations in the face of public criticism but explained that it would
"undertake a study of the rules of classification of entities for federal
tax purposes with special focus on the significance of the
characteristic of limited liability."53  In the absence of certainty
regarding the federal income tax treatment of LLCs,54 very few LLCs
were formed,55 and only one other state enacted an LLC statute. 6
49. See generally Larry E. Ribstein, LLCs: Is the Future Here?, BUS. L. TODAY, Nov./Dec.
2003, at 11 (discussing the history, benefit, and future of LLCs).
50. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 81-06-082 (Nov. 18, 1980).
5 1. Id.; Classification of Limited Liability Companies; Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 45
Fed. Reg. 75,709 (proposed Nov. 17, 1980) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 301) (proposing such
regulations).
52. In addition, the IRS ruled privately in 1982 that an LLC would be classified as an
association taxable as a corporation. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 83-04-138 (Oct. 29, 1982).
53. I.R.S. Announcement 83-4, 1983-2 I.R.B. 31.
54. See Susan Pace Hamill, The Limited Liability Company: A Catalyst Exposing the
Corporate Integration Question, 95 MICH. L. REv. 393, 402-03 & n.46 (1996) [hereinafter
Hamill, The LLC].
55. See Tom Petska et al., An Analysis of Business Organizational Structure and Activity
from Tax Data, at 9, 13, 28, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/05petska.pdf (showing
that, while complete data regarding the number of LLCs in existence is unavailable for years prior
to 1993, there were only approximately 17,000 LLCs taxed as partnerships in existence by 1993,
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In 1988, the IRS finally resolved the issue of the tax
classification of an LLC formed under Wyoming's LLC statute." In
a published revenue ruling, the Service concluded that any LLC
formed under Wyoming's LLC statute to carry on a business and
divide the gains therefrom would necessarily (by virtue of the terms
of the LLC statute itself) lack the corporate characteristics of
continuity of life and free transferability of interests, and therefore
would be classified as a partnership for federal tax purposes.18 The
Service reached this conclusion despite the fact that "neither the
managers nor the members of [the LLC] are personally liable for [the
LLC's] debts and obligations."59
After this IRS pronouncement clarifying the federal tax
classification of LLCs, demand for LLCs grew rapidly, and states
quickly began enacting their own LLC statutes.60 Some of these state
statutes, like Wyoming's LLC statute, were "bullet-proof," causing
any LLC formed thereunder to necessarily lack at least two corporate
characteristics, thereby automatically resulting in partnership
classification.6' Other state statutes were sufficiently flexible so as to
allow the LLC to qualify as either a partnership or a corporation for
federal tax purposes, depending on the terms of the specific LLC
agreement.2
which was a tiny number in comparison to the over 21 million businesses in existence in 1993).
56. See Florida Limited Liability Company Act, 1982 Fla. Laws 82-177 (enacted Apr. 21,
1982).
57. Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. LLC statutes were enacted in two states in 1990, four states in 1991, ten more states in
1992, eighteen more states in 1993, and by 1996, all fifty states had limited liability statutes. See
Hamill, The LLC, supra note 54, at 403-04. For the "inside story" on the rise of LLCs, see
Hamill, Story of LLCs, supra note 47.
61. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-80-101 to -1101 (West Supp. 1994); MICH.
CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 450.4101-.5200 (West 1994); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 86.011-.571
(West 1994); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 47-34-1 to -59 (1994); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-1000 to
-1073 (West 1993); W. VA. CODE §§ 31-1A-1 to -69 (Cum. Supp. 1994).
62. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 18-101 to -1107 (1992); MO. STAT. ANN. §§
359.70-908 (West 1994) (both allowing flexibility regarding transferability of interests and
centralized management). See generally Robert R. Keatinge et al., The Limited Liability
Company: A Study of the Emerging Entity, 47 BUS. LAW. 378, 425-30 (1992) (discussing the
application of the Kintner factors to LLC statutes from various states); Miller et al., supra note
14, at 586-600 (discussing "bullet proof' versus flexible LLC statutes).
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This flexibility afforded under some state LLC statutes
"highlight[ed] the failure of the resemblance test."63  One
commentator explained that, "[p]ractically speaking, there is no
difference between a closely-held entity that is organized as an LLC
and one that is organized as a corporation .... Left unchanged, two
very different tax regimes will govern entities with almost identical
management and perhaps even similar financial structures."'  The
failure of the corporate resemblance test was also illustrated by
professional corporations and limited partnerships, which are also
business organizations that could be classified for tax purposes as
partnerships under the corporate resemblance test while retaining
significant corporate features like limited liability.65 Moreover, given
the bright line rules set forth in the Kintner regulations and the
flexibility afforded under the applicable state business statutes,
practitioners were often able to create LLCs and other business
entities with a carefully tailored set of rights and responsibilities so
as to achieve tax classification as either a corporation or a
partnership, as desired by the client, while retaining significant
features of the other classification.66
B. Adopting an Explicitly Elective Entity
Classification Regime
In 1995, the Service acknowledged that the flexibility afforded
by applicable state laws undermined the theory of the corporate
resemblance test and explained:
[M]any states recently have revised their statutes to provide
that partnerships and other unincorporated organizations
may possess characteristics that have traditionally been
associated with corporations, thereby narrowing
63. Hobbs, supra note 21, at 517.
64. Id. at 517-18.
65. Seeid. at 481-510.
66. Littriello v. U.S., 484 F.3d 372, 376 (6th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1290 (2008)
("These unincorporated business entities had the characteristics of both corporations and
partnerships, combining ease of management with limited liability, and were increasingly
structured with the Kintner regulations in mind, in order to take advantage of whatever
classification was thought to be the most advantageous."); see also Victor E. Fleischer, "If It
Looks Like a Duck": Corporate Resemblance and Check-the-Box Elective Tax Classification, 96
COLUM. L. REv. 518, 527 (1996); William S. McKee, Issues Relating to Choice of Entry, Entity,
Characterization and the Consequences of Entering a Partnership, in TAX PLAN. FOR CORP.
JOINT VENTURES, PARTNERSHIPS & OTHER STRATEGIC ALLIANCES 9, 24-53 (PLI Tax Law and
Estate Planning, Course Handbook Series, No. J4-3673, 1994).
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considerably the traditional distinctions between
corporations and partnerships....
One consequence of the narrowing of the differences
under local law between corporations and partnerships is
that taxpayers can achieve partnership tax classification for
a non-publicly traded organization that, in all meaningful
respects, is virtually indistinguishable from a corporation.
The Service and Treasury recognize that there is
considerable flexibility under the current rules to effectively
change the classification of an organization at will ......
Accordingly, the preamble to the proposed CTB regulations
explained that the "Treasury and the IRS believe[d] that it [was]
appropriate to replace the increasingly formalistic rules under the
[Kintner] regulations with a much simpler approach that generally is
elective."68
Moreover, the Service acknowledged that, under the Kintner
regulations, "taxpayers and the IRS must expend considerable
resources on classification issues."69 Since the issuance of Revenue
Ruling 88-76, the Service issued seventeen revenue rulings, several
revenue procedures, and numerous letter rulings on entity
classification issues.7" Presumably, taxpayers also incurred
significant legal fees in obtaining advice on these classification
issues. Further, the Service noted that small businesses could be
particularly hard hit by the considerable costs of obtaining advice
regarding how to structure business entities to obtain the most
favorable combination of state law and tax treatment.7 ' These
additional cost, resource allocation, and distributive considerations
contributed to the Service's decision to move to a simplified elective
entity classification regime, where taxpayers could "elect to treat
67. I.R.S. Notice 95-14, 1995-14 I.R.B. 7.
68. Simplification of Entity Classification Rules, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,989, 21,990 (proposed
May 13, 1996) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 301).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.; see also Rod Garcia, Treasury Officials Address Check-the-Box Entities, 67 TAX
NOTES 1009 (1995) (A Treasury official explained: "It's a resource allocation question .... Too
many resources have been wasted both by the IRS and the private sector in resolving
classification issues, even though in the end the taxpayer gets the desired status ....
Classification becomes a very intricate game that if you have counsel[,] you get out of the maze
and you're home free.") (internal quotations omitted).
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certain domestic unincorporated business organizations as
partnerships or as associations for federal tax purposes,"72 while still
availing themselves of the local laws' flexibility for structuring
unincorporated businesses.73
As a result, regulations adopting an elective classification
regime were proposed in May of 1996,"4 were finalized in December
of 1996,"5 and became effective as of January 1, 1997.76 These CTB
regulations generally provide that a separate77 business" entity (not
subject to a special tax regime, like real estate mortgage investment
conduits) will be mandatorily classified as a corporation if it is a
domestic entity "organized under a Federal or State statute ... if the
statute describes or refers to the entity as incorporated or as a
corporation, body corporate, or body politic; 7 9 if it is a foreign entity
of a type enumerated in the regulations;0 or if it falls into certain
other specific categories." Any other separate business entity (an
"eligible entity") may choose its classification under the CTB
regulations; an eligible entity with two or more owners can elect
whether to be classified as a partnership or an association taxable as
a corporation, and an eligible entity with one owner can elect
whether to be classified as a disregarded entity or as an association
taxable as a corporation."2 The CTB regulations contain default rules
for these eligible entities, so an election is only needed when the
72. I.R.S. Notice 95-14, 1995-14 I.R.B. 7.
73. Simplification of Entity Classification Rules, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,990. This goal of
increased flexibility in organizational choice actually dates back to the adoption of Subchapter S,
enacted to enable "certain corporations to opt out of the double tax system so as to maximize
organizational choice for small business owners." Steven A. Bank, The Story of Double
Taxation: A Clash over the Control of Corporate Earnings, in BUS. TAX STORIES 153, 178
(Stephen A. Bank & Kirk J. Stark, eds., 2005) (citing S. REP. NO. 85-1983, at 87 (1958)).
74. Simplification of Entity Classification Rules, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,989.
75. T.D. 8697, 1997-1 C.B. 215.
76. Id. Although there have been some changes to the CTB regulations since 1997, they
remain largely as originally enacted. See infra note 125 and accompanying text.
77. The CTB classification regulations only apply if there is a separate entity for federal tax
purposes. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(a)(1) (as amended in 2009). See infra Part IV.B.1. and note
259.
78. In addition, the CTB regulations only apply if the separate entity is a business entity as
opposed to a trust or other entity subject to special treatment under the Code. Treas. Reg. §
301.7701-2(a) (as amended in 2008). See infra Part IV.B.2.
79. Treas Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(1) (as amended in 2008).
80. See id. § 301.7701-2(b)(8) (as amended in 2008).
81. Id. §§ 301.7701-2(b)(1), -2(b)(3) to -2(b)(7) (as amended in 2008).
82. Id. § 301.7701-3(a) (as amended in 2006).
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eligible entity wishes to be classified in a manner different than the
default classification. 3
The default rules differ slightly for domestic and foreign eligible
entities. The default for a domestic eligible entity is treatment as a
partnership if it has two or more members and as a disregarded entity
if it has one member.84  The default for a foreign eligible entity is
treatment as an association if all members have limited liability;
otherwise, it will be treated as a partnership or disregarded entity
(depending on the number of members).85 Notwithstanding the
largely elective nature of the CTB regulations, partnerships remain
subject to the publicly traded partnership rules of Code section 7704,
which generally tax as a corporation any partnership whose interests
are publicly traded. 6
The replacement of the Kintner regulations' corporate
resemblance test with the CTB regulations led to a flurry of activity
among commentators, most of whom supported the new explicitly
elective approach.87  Commentators generally agreed with the
Service that a largely elective approach would simplify the entity
classification of businesses,8 afford greater certainty to taxpayers
83. Id.
84. Id. § 301.7701-3(b)(1) (as amended in 2006).
85. Id. § 301.7701-3(b)(2) (as amended in 2006).
86. t.R.C. § 7704 (2008).
87. See, e.g., The Association of the Bar of the City of New York Committee on Taxation of
Partnerships and Other Pass-Through Entities, Report on the Proposed "Check-the-Box"
Regulations on Entity Classification, 51 THE RECORD 663 (1996) ("enthusiastically" supporting
the proposed CTB regulations); Sheri E. Nott & Richard J. Razook, Classification of Entities for
Tax Purposes Just "Check the Box", FLA. B. J., May 1997, at 70, 73 ("The check-the-box
regulations have been warmly greeted by the business community ...."). See also George K.
Yin, The Taxation of Private Business Enterprises: Some Policy Questions Stimulated by the
"Check-the-Box " Regulations, 51 SMU L. REV. 125, 125 n.2 (collecting articles praising the CTB
regulations).
88. See, e.g., Craig W. Friedrich, One Step Forward-Final Check-the-Box Entity
Classification Regulations Issued, 24 J. CORP. TAX'N 107 (1997); New York State Bar
Association Tax Section, NYSBA Tax Section Strongly Endorses Check-the-Box Entity
Classification Proposal, 95 TAX NOTES TODAY 173-64 (Sept. 5, 1995) (asserting that an
explicitly elective classification regime would "considerably simplify the tax law"); Roger F.
Pillow, John G. Schmalz & Samuel P. Starr, Check-the-Box Proposed Regs. Simplify the Entity
Classification Process, 85 J. TAX'N 72 (1996) (concluding that the proposed CTB regulations
"dramatically simplify the classification process"). Cf JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 105TH
CONG., REVIEW OF SELECTED ENTITY CLASSIFICATION AND PARTNERSHIP TAX ISSUES, No.
JCS-6-97, at 17 (Comm. Print 1997) (noting that "the principal impact is that taxpayers may now
choose with greater simplicity and lower compliance costs whether they will pay two levels of tax
on business income under the corporate tax rules, or whether they will pay only one level of tax
under the partnership tax rules[;]" but also noting that the CTB regulations will also raise several
new issues). But see Aaron W. Brooks, Chuck the Box: Proposed Entity Classification
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that they would receive their desired and expected treatment, 9 and
reduce the transaction costs and economic burden that the pre-CTB
entity classification regime imposed on taxpayers and the Service. 9
Moreover, commentators generally concurred with the Service's
assessment that the traditional distinctions between corporations and
partnerships had been sufficiently blurred so that the Kintner
regulations were increasingly formalistic,9 meaning that an explicitly
elective regime would allow for much more flexibility in the
business entities' operating agreements92  without introducing
additional legal inconsistencies.93 To a significant extent, the CTB
Regulations Bring Bad Policy, 70 TAX NOTES 1669, 1673-74 (1996) (arguing that the perceived
need for simplification was temporary); Yin, supra note 87, at 125, 146-58 (suggesting that the
CTB regulations may not "prove to be a simplifying change in the law").
89. See Fleischer, supra note 66, at 532 (noting that the CTB regulations "assure[] investors
that they will receive flow-through treatment").
90. See Susan Pace Hamill, The Taxation of Domestic Limited Liability Companies and
Limited Partnerships: A Case for Eliminating the Partnership Classification Regulations, 73
WASH. U.L.Q. 565, 600 (1995) [hereinafter Hamill, Taxation] (CTB regulations "save both
taxpayers and the Service an enormous, if largely unmeasurable, amount of transaction costs.
Without having to seek expensive advice or use the Service's resources, persons deciding among
the major domestic entities-the corporation, the partnership, and the LLC-can be absolutely
certain of the tax treatment of their entity."); Fleischer, supra note 66, at 531-32 (commenting
that the CTB regulations "reduce[] the transaction costs of closely examining local law when
organizing a business venture"); ABA Tax Lawyers Embrace 'Check-the-Box' Proposal and Say
Extend It to Foreign Organizations, 95 TAX NOTES TODAY 145-25 (July 26, 1995) [hereinafter
ABA Tax Lawyers] (noting the significant professional fees incurred by taxpayers and the costs
imposed on the Service and the Treasury). Cf JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 88, at 17,
(suggesting that the CTB regulations lower taxpayers compliance costs).
91. See Hamill, Taxation, supra note 90, at 600 (CTB regulations "add[] no new legal
inconsistencies or formalistic distinctions to those that already exist under the current
classification regulations. The choice of entities in the business world has evolved to a point
where the traditional business characteristics once attributable only to corporations can be found
in limited partnerships, while the traditional partnership characteristics can be found in many
statutory corporations."); New York State Bar Association Tax Section, supra note 88 ("Many of
the legal distinctions in the classification area are largely formalistic and/or do not seem
particularly relevant to the question of whether an entity should be treated as a corporation.").
But see Brooks, supra note 88, at 1671 (arguing that the distinction between corporations and
partnerships was not really narrowing.)
92. See Jerold A. Friedland, Tax Considerations in Selecting a Business Entity: The New
Entity Classification Rules, 9 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 109, 124-25 (1996) (concluding that under the
CTB regulations, business entities would no longer be required to have particular provisions in
their operating agreements regarding continuity of life, treatment at dissolution, and free
transferability of interests). Cf Association of the Bar of the City of New York, supra note 87, at
664 (explaining that before the CTB regulations, "[p]artnership agreements [were] permeated
with provisions designed to address [entity classification] issues which have no relationship to the
parties' business arrangement," and noting that such provisions would be unnecessary under an
elective classification regime).
93. Hamill, Taxation, supra note 90, at 600; New York State Bar Association Tax Section,
supra note 88, at 93 (explicit election will not "materially chang[e] the substantive outcome of the
vast majority of cases").
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regulations merely turned an implicit election regarding entity
classification (whereby taxpayers could effectively elect entity
classification through action, by including specific terms in a
business entity's operating agreement)94 into an explicit election
(whereby taxpayers choose their tax treatment by filing a form with
the IRS), while reducing the "toll charge" for making the election95
and leveling the playing field between sophisticated and
unsophisticated business owners.96 As a result, commentators
suggested that an explicitly elective entity classification regime could
increase efficiency by removing the tax barrier hindering business
entities from having the optimal combination of business terms97 and
by promoting proper resource allocation.9" In addition, while some
commentators expressed concerns that the CTB regulations might
lead to a rise of "disincorporation" and hence to an erosion of the
94. See New York State Bar Association Tax Section, supra note 88 ("[E]ntity classification
under [the pre-CTB regime] is effectively elective in the domestic context, at least for well-
advised taxpayers.... [Plarties always find a way to take [steps to organize the entity so that it
will achieve the desired entity classification status] because of the paramount importance of
achieving the desired entity classification."). Cf JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 88, at
17 (noting that while "entity classification regulations in effect prior to the check-the-box
regulations were.., effectively elective for well-advised taxpayers, [the CTB regulations] make
this choice much more broadly available to all businesses").
95. See ABA Tax Lawyers, supra note 90 (explaining that, while the entity classification
under the pre-CTB regime was effectively elective, the pre-CTB regime imposed a "significant
toll charge" on taxpayers in making that election in the form of professional fees incurred to
"navigate the tricky and somewhat difficult straits of the [pre-CTB] classification regulations").
96. See id. ("While knowledgeable taxpayers can effectively elect whether their business
enterprises will be classified as corporations or partnerships, less sophisticated taxpayers may not
be aware of the available options. The result is that similar types of taxpayers are treated
differently based solely on the relative amount of knowledge and sophistication they possess.
Even those taxpayers who are knowledgeable must incur significant costs for professional
advice."). Cf JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 88, at 17 (recognizing that the CTB
regulations "make [the choice of tax classification] much more broadly available to all
businesses").
97. See Karen C. Burke, The Uncertain Future of Limited Liability Companies, 12 AM. J.
TAX. POL'Y 13, 35 (1995) (explaining that Kintner regulations forced LLCs to have non-
corporate characteristics, which may "represent a net detriment that may undermine the efficiency
of LLCs"); William A. Klein & Eric M. Zolt, Business Form, Limited Liability, and Tax Regimes:
Lurching Toward a Coherent Outcome?, 66 U. COLO. L. REv. 1001, 1002 (1995) ("The [pre-
CTB] tax system.., generates an incentive to adopt suboptimal organizational forms."); New
York State Bar Association Tax Section, supra note 88 ("The [pre-CTB] system also creates
economic inefficiencies in that it requires taxpayers to make certain business decisions (such as
management structure, transferability of interests in the entity and exposure to liabilities) based
on tax considerations.").
98. See New York State Bar Association Tax Section, supra note 88; Daniel Shefler, Check
the Box Partnership Classification: A Legitimate Exercise in Tax Simplification, 67 TAX NOTES
279, 281 (1995).
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corporate tax base,99 others concluded that the adoption of the CTB
regulations was unlikely to result in a significant drain on the fisc.
This was, in part because, for closely-held businesses, "the well
advised have always been able to avoid the corporate tax by forming
as a partnership or LLC that complies with the classification
regulations or a corporation that pays out its earnings in deductible
items or elects Subchapter S."'°
Notwithstanding the foregoing, other commentators expressed
words of caution about the new CTB regime. Specifically, some
questioned the real need for simplification.. and the ability of the
CTB regulations to accomplish simplification;0 2 others discussed
difficulties that could arise from applying the CTB regulations to
foreign entities;" 3 some questioned whether states would follow the
federal tax treatment of entities classified under the CTB
regulations;' 4 and still others questioned whether the parameters and
scope of the CTB election made good policy sense.0 5 Commentators
99. See ABA Tax Lawyers, supra note 90 (acknowledging such concern, but not giving it
much weight); William C. Sheffield, New Jersey and the Limited Liability Company-Perfect
Together?, 25 RUTGERS L.J. 151, 170 n. 138 (1993); Shefter, supra note 98, at 281-82.
100. Hamill, Taxation, supra note 90, at 600 (also commenting that the fisc is protected
because the "publicly traded partnership provisions still prevent LLCs and limited partnerships
from displacing the domain of the C corporation").
101. See, e.g., Brooks, supra note 88, at 1673 (arguing that the perceived need for
simplification might be temporary).
102. See Yin, supra note 87, at 125, 146-58.
103. See, e.g., JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 88, at 19-21; Simplification of Entity
Classification Rules, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,989, 21,992 (proposed May 13, 1996) (to be codified at 26
C.F.R. pt. 301) (raising the application of the CTB regulations to foreign entities as a possible
concern); Marc M. Levey & Richard D. Teigen, International Implications of "Check-the-Box ",
85 J. TAX'N 261, 261 (1996) (discussing potential issues with regard to "accelerating U.S.
taxation of Subpart F income, the status of foreign entities that may have been acquired or
divested by U.S. taxpayers ... and an entity's ability to change its classification[,] ... transfer
pricing, treaty withholding, functional currency, and hybridizing existing entities"); New York
State Bar Association Tax Section, supra note 88 (discussing "a number of potential areas of
abuse" that may arise from applying an elective entity classification regime to foreign entities, but
"conclud[ing] that the potential for abuse would not be exacerbated to any significant extent by
applying an elective classification system to foreign entities... [and arguing that] the appropriate
means to deal with potential abuses in the foreign area is to adopt specific reforms targeted to the
particular abuses involved"); Michael L. Schler, Initial Thoughts on the Proposed "Check-the-
Box" Regulations, 96 TAX NOTES TODAY 118-79 (June 17, 1996); Joni L. Walser & Robert E.
Culbertson, Encore Une Fois: Check-the-Box on the International Stage, 76 TAX NOTES 403
(1997).
104. See, e.g., Scott D. Smith, What Are States Doing on the Check-the-Box Regs?, 76 TAX
NOTES 973 (1997).
105. See Yin, supra note 87, at 129-36 (asking whether "the income taxation of business
firms [should] be determined by explicit taxpayer election[,]" whether "public firms [should] be
ineligible to make the explicit classification election[,]" whether "state law corporations [should]
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critiqued a number of other aspects of the CTB regulations, including
the transition rules and the treatment of changes in entity
classification." 6 Further, some commentators noted that the CTB
regulations did nothing to address the key issue of whether the
federal tax system should retain multiple tax regimes for business
entities.1"7 In addition to these words of caution (many of which still
resonate today, as will be discussed in the remainder of this Article),
some commentators questioned whether the Treasury had the
statutory authority to promulgate the CTB regulations.'
Nevertheless, the final CTB regulations were adopted effective as of
the beginning of 1997. The regulations were upheld recently,0 9 and
today, entity classification continues to be determined under these
largely elective entity classification regulations.
III. EXAMINING THE CTB REGULATIONS As
APPLIED OVER THE PAST DECADE
Between 1997 and 2007, over 326,000 valid CTB elections were
filed with the IRS, and the number of CTB elections has increased
almost every year."0 Further, millions of other entities have been
be ineligible to make the classification election[,]" and why "private business firms [should] be
entitled to choose among Subchapters C, S, and K as their applicable method of taxation").
106. See, e.g., Association of the Bar of the City of New York, supra note 87, at 666-70
(criticizing transition rules, default rules, and treatment of changes in classification by election).
107. Daniel S. Goldberg, The Tax Treatment of Limited Liability Companies: Law in Search
of Policy, 50 Bus. LAW. 995, 998, 1006-17 (1995) (arguing that, even under an elective entity
classification regime, the federal tax system still lacks a coherent policy objective in
distinguishing entities that are subject to an entity level tax and entities that are taxed as pass-
through); Hamill, Taxation, supra note 90, at 607-08 (arguing that the "problem at the center of
business taxation" is that there are "two extremely different tax regimes, the corporate and
partnership provisions, [that] arbitrarily apply to entities that often have almost identical business
characteristics"); Yin, supra note 87, at 136.
108. See, e.g., JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 88, at 13-17, 26-27 (discussing the
legal authority for the CTB regulations and suggesting legislative action); Fleischer, supra note
66, at 520 (addressing such concern but arguing that the CTB regulations "satisfie[d]
administrative law standards as a reasonable implementation of the congressional mandate to
impose the corporate tax on those entities that resemble corporations"). Commentators continue
to dispute the Treasury's authority to promulgate these regulations. See, e.g., Brant J. Hellwig &
Gregg D. Polsky, The Employment Tax Challenge to the Check-the-Box Regulations, Ill TAX
NOTES 1039 (2006).
109. Littriello v. United States, 484 F.3d 372 (6th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1290
(2008).
110. I.R.S. Statistics of Income Division (June 2008) (unpublished data on file with author).
With respect to all data referenced herein, note that 2007 data is preliminary, that the counts
include Form 8832s processed by Statistics of Income through June 2008, that the counts only
include filings with valid and complete information, and that calendar year counts are based on
the election date reported by the taxpayer and any corrections made by the Internal Revenue
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classified under the default entity classification rules contained in the
CTB regulations."' This experience with the CTB regulations can be
used to help evaluate to what extent the CTB regulations have
achieved their goals, as articulated by the Service and commentators.
A. Simplicity, Administrability, & Certainty
1. Benefits from the CTB Regulations
The CTB regulations make it simpler for business entities to
achieve their desired tax classification with certainty. The CTB
regime reduced the number of concepts that have to be evaluated in
order to determine entity classification and eliminated the concepts
that created the most uncertainty and required the greatest amount of
analysis under the Kintner regulations (the four factors discussed
above)." 2 Now, the mere choice of a particular form of entity is
sufficient to dictate the default entity classification;" 3 no longer must
taxpayers include tax-motivated terms into the operating agreements
of domestic business entities in order to achieve a particular tax
status."4 This allows taxpayers, particularly those who are seeking
pass-through treatment, to achieve their desired tax classification
Service at the time of filing relative to the filing requirements. The number of elections dipped in
1998, 2000, and 2007; the numbers of elections increased during all other years, with the biggest
increase in elections in 2002 (a 236 percent increase on the number of elections for 2001). The
numbers of annual CTB elections for each calendar year (CY) during the period from 1997 to
2007 are as follows: CY 1997 - 10,016; CY 1998 - 7,481; CY 1999 - 11,890; CY 2000 - 11,808;
CY 2001 - 13,273; CY 2002 - 31,329; CY 2003 - 40,650; CY 2004 - 49,847; CY 2005 -
50,796; CY 2006 - 64,119; and CY 2007 - 35,124. Id. See infra Appendix A (illustrating the
trends in number and type of CTB elections from 1997 to 2007).
111. All business entities, including millions of businesses formed since 1997 and the
millions of pre-existing businesses, must be classified (as corporations, partnerships, or
disregarded entities) for federal income tax purposes. Cf Marty Harris & Ken Szeflinski,
Celebrating Ninety Years of SOP: Selected Corporate Data, 1916-2004, in STATISTICS OF
INCOME BULLETIN, FALL 2007, at 279, 286, 289, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
soi/07cobulhis.pdf (noting that in 2004, there were approximately 5.5 million corporate
businesses, 3.5 million S corporations, 2.5 million partnerships, and 20.6 million non-farm sole
proprietorships).
112. Steven A. Dean, Attractive Complexity: Tax Deregulation, the Check-the-Box Election,
and the Future of Tax Simplification, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 405, 442-43 (2005).
113. If a state law corporation is chosen, the entity will be taxed as a corporation for tax
purposes, but if an LLC, limited partnership, limited liability partnership, or general partnership is
chosen, the entity will be taxed as a partnership (or disregarded entity) for tax purposes unless an
election is made. Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-2 (as amended in 2008) to -3 (as amended in 2006).
114. Foreign entities are not quite as simple, as the default classification for foreign eligible
entities depends in part on whether any member of the entity has unlimited liability for the
business's debts. Id. § 301.7701-3(b) (as amended in 2006).
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while having more latitude to organize their business arrangement in
accordance with their business, rather than tax, needs. 1 5 Moreover,
if the default entity classification is not desired or if there remains
some question as to the appropriate default classification," 6 eligible
entities can simply file an entity classification election in order to
achieve the desired classification with a high degree of certainty.
The default rules seem to work reasonably well, given that, since
1997, only approximately 174,000 newly formed domestic entities" 7
(out of millions of businesses entities formed since 1997)' filed
entity classification elections. Frankly, it is surprising that even this
many CTB elections were filed for newly formed entities given that:
(1) with respect to entities electing to be treated as partnerships or
disregarded entities, any newly formed eligible entity will receive
this classification by default;" 9 and (2) with respect to entities
electing corporate treatment (approximately 87 percent of initial
classification elections filed by domestic entities), 12 the total number
of C corporations actually declined significantly over the period
since 1997.121 Moreover, even for entities desiring corporate status,
115. See generally Dean, supra note 112, at 443-45 (discussing how the demise of the
Kintner four factor test has benefited taxpayers). Taxpayers forming business entities still must
make business decisions about management control, restrictions on the ability to transfer
interests, liability of the owners for the business entity's debts, and events upon which the
enterprise will terminate. However, under the CTB regulations, these decisions can be made
solely for business reasons, without influence from the tax regime.
116. This could arise, for example, for foreign entities, if the taxpayer is not completely sure
whether the owners of the business entity will have limited or unlimited liability under the
applicable foreign law.
117. I.R.S. Statistics of Income Division (June 2008) (unpublished data on file with author).
See infra Appendix A, Figure 2 (illustrating the number and type of CTB elections made by
domestic entities from 1997 to 2007).
118. Kelly Luttrell et al., Integrated Business Data, 2003, in STATISTICS OF INCOME
BULLETIN, FALL 2006, at 47, 53-55, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/03intbus.pdf.
119. A domestic "eligible entity" (i.e., one that can make a CTB election) is, by definition,
not mandatorily taxed as a corporation, meaning that an election for an eligible entity to be taxed
as a partnership or disregarded entity seems unnecessary. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(a) (as
amended in 2006). These may be protective elections, elections involving new types of entities
(like Series LLCs), or elections by business arrangements where it is unclear whether or not there
is a separate business entity.
120. I.R.S. Statistics of Income Division (June 2008) (unpublished data on file with author).
See infra Appendix A, Figure 2 (illustrating the number and type of CTB elections made by
domestic entities from 1997 to 2007). See also supra note 119 (explaining why very few
domestic eligible entities make initial classification elections to be treated as partnerships or
disregarded entities).
121. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, TAX REFORM: SELECTED FEDERAL TAX ISSUES RELATING
TO SMALL BUSINESS AND CHOICE OF ENTITY, No. JCX-48-08, at 8 (Comm. Print 2008). This
might be explained if the number of newly formed corporations was just less than the number of
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such classification is easily obtained without an election, by use of an
entity incorporated under state or federal law.
22
The increased simplicity and certainty created by the CTB
regulations also eases administrability by making it easier for the
Service to identify which entities will be treated as corporations and
which will be treated as partnerships (or disregarded entities). The
Service is relieved from having to inquire into the specific state law
rights and responsibilities of the entity and its members and from
having to examine the specific terms included in the entity's
operating agreement.
23
Further, the CTB regime's disentanglement from applicable
state law allows state legislatures to design business statutes with
only business goals in mind. State legislatures' tasks are simplified
because the CTB rules relieve legislators from the burden of
potentially designing business laws to satisfy tax law requirements.1
24
2. Detriments from the CTB Regulations
The CTB regulations, though simplifying in some ways, have
added complexity in others. A sign of that complexity is the fact that
the CTB regulations have been amended more than ten times in the
twelve years since their effective date. 125  Further, the Service has
corporations that changed classifications or dissolved. However, given the growth in the number
of S corporations, the almost 200,000 domestic entities electing to be taxed as corporations may
be, at least to some extent, eligible entities electing corporate status so that they could further
elect S corporation status. Id. Cf Treas. Reg. 301.7701-3(c)(1)(v)(C) (as amended in 2006)
(eligible entities that elect S corporation status are deemed to make a check-the-box election).
However, at least as of 2003 (the last year for which S corporation data is published), "the
number of [S corporation] returns with an 'LLC' designation in the Statistics of Income corporate
file is unpublished and small." Kelly Luttrell, S Corporation Returns, 2003, in STATISTICS OF
INCOME BULLETIN, SPRING 2006, at 91, 103, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
soi/03scorp.pdf.
122. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(1) (as amended in 2008). The domestic eligible entities
initially electing corporate status may want to be taxed as a corporation initially, but may also
want to preserve the ability to change tax classification easily later and without the hassle of
actually undertaking the necessary state law steps to effectuate a corporate liquidation and
partnership formation. Additionally, it has been suggested to me that some of these elections may
result from state law tax planning-an entity can form as a state law partnership and then check
the box in order to be treated as a corporation for federal income tax purposes while avoiding the
state income or franchise tax levied on state law corporations.
123. The Kintner regulations looked to the state law governing the particular type of entity
and to the operating agreement for the particular entity in order to determine which corporate-like
characteristics were present. 26 C.F.R. §§ 301.7701-2 to -3 (1960). The CTB regulations do not
require this inquiry. Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-2 (as amended in 2008) to -3 (as amended in 2006).
124. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
125. A number of these amendments merely added additional entities to the list of foreign per
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issued numerous revenue rulings, revenue procedures, and private
letter rulings issued over the last decade dealing, at least in part, with
entity classification or how other tax provisions are applied in light
of the entity classification rules. 1
26
The complexity created by the CTB regulations arises largely
from the existence of the election itself, the widespread introduction
of "disregarded entities,"'' 27 the Service's inclination to use a
substantive, standards-based approach to applying a purportedly
formalistic rule-based system, and the application of the CTB rules
to foreign entities. 21 Issues posed by the application of the CTB
regulations to foreign entities will be discussed in Part III.D, and
each of the other main sources of complexity will be addressed in
turn.
a. The existence of the election itself
Elections are often regarded as "inherently costly and
complex.' 1 29  This view derives partly from the fact that, when an
election is available, there are necessarily multiple possible tax
outcomes, and thus taxpayers must analyze (and often incur the costs
se corporations. See, e.g., T.D. 9197, 2005-1 C.B. 985. In comparison, the entity classification
regulations were amended only five times during their thirty-six years of applicability. See T.D.
6797, 1965-1 C.B. 553; T.D. 7515, 1977-2 C.B. 482; T.D. 7889, 1983-1 C.B. 362; T.D. 8475,
1993-23 I.R.B. 11, corrected 1993-1 C.B. 236; T.D. 8632, 1996-1 C.B. 85. That said, the
complexity of the pre-CTB entity classification regulations did involve significant uncertainty,
generating over one thousand articles. See Richard M. Lipton & John T. Thomas, Proposed
Check-the-Box Business Classification Regulations Simplify Rules, 13 J. PARTNERSHIP TAX'N
195, 199 (1996).
126. A May 6, 2008, Westlaw search for ("301.7701-1" or "301-7701-2" or "301.7701-3") in
the Cumulative Bulletin since January 1, 1997, yielded 78 results. Granted, several of these
results were revenue procedures articulating procedures for requesting private letter rulings or
indicating areas in which private letter rulings would not be granted. See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 2008-1,
2008-1 I.R.B. 1. However, a majority of the results did discuss a substantive issue regarding the
entity classification rules or regarding the application of other tax provisions in light of the entity
classification rules. See, e.g., infra notes 146-45, 149-49, and 153. This is a very rough (and
admittedly unscientific) measure of complexity. The same Westlaw search in private letter
rulings and technical advice memoranda in the last 10 years yielded 1204 results.
127. The concept of disregarded entities did exist before the CTB regulations (e.g., qualified
REIT subsidiaries), but with a much more limited applicability. I.R.C. § 865(i) (1999); see also
JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, No.
JCS-10-87 Pt. 2, at 384-401 (Comm. Print 1987).
128. In addition to these sources of complexity at the federal level, states had to decide
whether or not to conform their state law entity classification rules to the new federal CTB
regulations. See Smith, supra note 104.
129. See Yin, supra note 87, at 130.
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to obtain advice regarding) which alternative is preferable. 3 °
However, even absent an explicit entity classification election, as
long as the federal income tax retains multiple regimes for taxing
businesses, a taxpayer forming a new business enterprise still has to
determine whether an entity taxed as a corporation or an entity taxed
as a partnership would be preferable. Absent an explicit election, the
only meaningful difference would be that taxpayers would have less
flexibility in choosing their preferred state law business form.'31
Hence, in that narrow sense, the existence of the election does not
add any complexity.
Nevertheless, one commentator argued that the vast majority of
the simplification benefits of the CTB regime could have been
obtained by merely moving away from the multi-factored Kintner
regulations but without introducing an election (i.e., by making the
CTB default rules mandatory).'32 The commentator also argued that
the inclusion of an explicit election actually reverses some of the
simplification benefits that could have been obtained by adopting a
mandatory classification regime.'33 For example, the elective nature
of the CTB regulations makes it relatively easy for a business entity
to switch between partnership and corporate classification,' but
such changes "mimic[] a variety of transactions,"'35 meaning that
elective changes in entity classification caused uncertainty (and
hence complexity) until regulations'36 were issued explaining how
130. See id.
131. For example, if the default rules under the CTB regulations were mandatory (and
taxpayers could not elect different tax treatment), a taxpayer wanting to form a domestic business
entity that would be taxed as a corporation would need to incorporate under state or federal law;
the taxpayer could not use an LLC and elect corporate tax treatment (even if the LLC was
otherwise the taxpayer's desired business form under state law).
132. Dean, supra note 112, at 449-57.
133. Id.
134. From 1997 to 2007, over 96,000 entities have filed CTB election forms that indicate that
the filing changes the classification under the CTB regulations. I.R.S. Statistics of Income
Division (June 2008) (unpublished data on file with author). See infra Appendix A, Figures 2 &
3 (illustrating the number of initial elections and status change elections for domestic and foreign
entities filing CTB elections from 1997 to 2007). Changing entity classification under an elective
regime only requires the filing of a sheet of paper. Entity Classification Election, I.R.S. Form
8832 (rev. Mar. 2007). However, the frequency of allowable elective changes in classification is
limited. See Treas. Reg. §301.7701-3(c)(1)(iv) (as amended in 2006); see also infra Part IV.B.3.
In contrast, under a mandatory entity classification regime, changing from a partnership to a
corporation would require an actual incorporation, and changing from a corporation to a
partnership would require an actual liquidation followed by a contribution to a new partnership.
135. Dean, supra note 112, at 454.
136. T.D. 8844, 1999-2 C.B. 661 (adopting final regulations regarding the taxation of elective
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such elective changes in classification would be taxed. Furthermore,
the availability of an explicit entity classification election means that
taxpayers wanting to make the election must comply with the
technical requirements for making an effective election.
In addition, while the entity classification form itself is
straightforward,'37 the form must be filed timely (not more than
seventy-five days prior to and not more than twelve months after the
date on which the election is to be effective).' There needs to be
some deadline for making the election so that the Service can
administer the tax laws, but the timing requirement adds complexity
because many taxpayers fail to make the election on time. Then, the
taxpayers petition the Service to allow a late filing,'39 and the Service
must spend time and resources determining whether a late election
should be allowed. Since the adoption of the final CTB regulations,
the Service has issued numerous private letter rulings allowing late
entity classification elections 4 ° and has issued revenue procedures
explaining how to obtain relief for late CTB filings.' Further, there
are other potential technical deficiencies that could cause an entity
classification election to be ineffective'42 or inadvertently changed,'43
changes in entity classification). These final regulations generally adopted the approach reflected
in the 1997 proposed regulations regarding the taxation in elective entity classification. See
Treatment of Changes in Elective Entity Classification, 62 Fed. Reg. 55,768 (proposed Oct. 28,
1997).
137. Entity Classification Election, I.R.S. Form 8832 (rev. Mar. 2007).
138. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(c)(1)(iii) (as amended in 2006).
139. Id. § 301.9100-1 (as amended in 1997).
140. See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2008-24-003 (June 13, 2008); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 98-35-
012 (Aug. 28, 1998).
141. See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 2007-62, 2007-41 I.R.B. 786; Rev. Proc. 2002-59, 2002-2 C.B. 615.
These revenue procedures are in addition to the existing regulations that generally apply to late
filings. Treas. Reg. § 301.9100-1 (as amended in 1997).
142. For example, an entity cannot change its classification election more than once every
five years (absent consent by the Service). In order to make sure that this limitation is followed,
the Service's revision to the entity classification election form added new questions to "highlight"
this limitation. See Instructions for Entity Classification Election, I.R.S. Form 8832 (rev. Mar.
2007), at 3. Another example is that the entity classification election form must be signed by the
right people under Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(c)(2) (as amended in 2006), and the form must be
attached to the entity's federal tax return for the year in which the election is made (or if the entity
is not required to file a return, attached to the tax returns filed by the direct or indirect owner of
the entity). Id. § 301.7701-3(c)(1)(ii) (as amended in 2006).
143. See John E. Bragonje, The Rise and Fall of the Check-the-Box Regime: A Solution to
Recent Private Letter Rulings' Troubling Use of the De Facto Corporation Doctrine, 2005 TAX
NOTES TODAY 87-45 (May 6, 2005) (discussing the entity classification consequences when a
corporation has its charter revoked for failure to violations of state corporation law).
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resulting in the taxpayer's petition for relief and the Service's
resources spent determining whether to grant such relief.
b. The introduction of disregarded entities
The CTB regulations' widespread introduction of the concept of
disregarded entities also created complexity, both in determining
which entities will be treated as disregarded entities and in
determining how existing tax rules apply to these "tax nothings."
The CTB regulations provide that a domestic eligible entity with a
single owner will be disregarded as separate from its owner,1" but
the "single owner" determination proved to be more complex than
anticipated. 45 For example, the Service had to determine whether an
entity has a "single owner" if two spouses living in a community
property state each hold interests in the entity'46 and whether an
entity has a "single owner" if it is owned by a corporation and a
disregarded entity that is owned by that corporation.'47 Even for
entities identified as disregarded entities, taxpayers and the Service
encountered difficulties in applying the discharge of indebtedness
rules to them;'48 in analyzing how to tax transactions in which
disregarded entities become partnerships (and vice versa);'49 in
determining how the partnership audit provisions apply when a
disregarded entity was a partner in a partnership; 5 ° in identifying
what employer identification number should be used by a
disregarded entity;' 5 ' and in determining how employment taxes
would apply to disregarded entities,'52 among other issues. 53
144. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(b)(1)(ii) (as amended in 2006); see also id. § 301.7701-
3(b)(2)(i)(C) (as amended in 2006) (providing that a foreign eligible entity will be treated as
disregarded "if it has a single owner that does not have limited liability").
145. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 2004-77, 2004-2 C.B. 119.
146. Rev. Proc. 2002-69, 2002-2 C.B. 831 (following the taxpayers' choice as to the answer
of this question).
147. Rev. Rul. 2004-77, 2004-2 C.B. 119 (treating the entity as only having a single owner);
see, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 1999-14-006 (Apr. 9, 1999).
148. See Stephanie R. Hoffer, Give Them My Regards: A Proposal for Applying the COD
Rules to Disregarded Entities, 107 TAx NOTES 327 (2005).
149. Rev. Rul. 99-6, 1999-1 C.B. 432 (partnership to a disregarded entity); Rev. Rul. 99-5,
1999-1 C.B. 434 (disregarded entity to a partnership); see also I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2002-22-026
(May 31, 2002).
150. Rev. Rul. 2004-88, 2004-2 C.B. 165; see also Alice G. Abreu, Paradise Kept: A Rule-
Based Approach to the Analysis of Transactions Involving Disregarded Entities, 59 SMU L. REV.
491 (2006).
151. Rev. Rul. 2001-61,2001-2 C.B. 573.
152. See generally Littriello v. United States, 484 F.3d 372 (6th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128
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c. The return to a substantive, standards-based analysis
In grappling with some of the above complications (namely the
"single owner" problem and the analysis of inadvertent classification
changes), the Service deviated from the formalistic rule-based
approach embodied in the CTB regulations and adopted a more
substantive analysis. Commentators argue that the simplicity and
certainty benefits afforded by the CTB regulations are eroded as and
to the extent that the Service reintroduces a substantive or standards-
based approach back into an otherwise bright-line rule-based
regime. "'
3. Issues on Which the CTB Regulations Had No Effect
Some complexity inherent in the entity classification
determination was left unchanged by the CTB regulations. The CTB
regulations did not attempt to solve, and had no effect on, a few
threshold aspects of entity classification. Before classifying a
business entity, there must still be a determination as to whether a
separate entity exists at all.155 The CTB regulations did not change
that requirement, although query whether the elective nature of the
CTB regulations may make it easier for a business arrangement to
S. Ct. 1290 (2008) (involving a dispute regarding employment taxes); see also Hellwig & Polsky,
supra note 108.
153. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 2003-125, 2003-2 C.B. 1243 (analyzing whether a worthless security
deduction is available when an entity classification election is made to change the classification
of an entity from a corporation to a disregarded entity).
154. See Abreu, supra note 150, at 516-45 (discussing the Service's deviation from the
bright-line CTB regulations when the Service used a substance-focused analysis to conclude that
an LLC with two state law members could be treated as a disregarded entity and to conclude that
debt held by a corporation was not "modified" (and therefore did not cause the realization of gain
or loss) when the corporation became a disregarded entity); Bragonje, supra note 143 (discussing
the Service's use of the substance-focused "de facto corporation doctrine" to conclude that a
corporation had not liquidated for tax purposes, and thus would not be subject to the double
corporate tax upon liquidation, despite the fact that the state had revoked the corporation's charter
for technical violations of corporation law, meaning that the entity would have ceased to be
classified as a corporation under the literal application of the CTB regulations).
155. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1 (as amended by T.D. 8697, 1997-1 C.B. 215) (requiring the
identification of a separate entity before the entity classification rules can be applied); cf Rev.
Proc. 2002-22, 2002-1 C.B. 733 (undivided fractional interest in property may not be a business
entity to which the Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3 classification regulations apply). For an extremely
useful summary of primary authorities addressing the issue of whether a separate entity exists, see
generally Bradley T. Borden, Catalogue of Legal Authority Addressing the Federal Definition of
Tax Partnership, in 746 TAX PLAN. DOMESTIC & FOREIGN PARTNERSHIPS, LLCS, JOINT
VENTURES & OTHER STRATEGIC ALLIANCES 477 (PLI Tax Law and Estate Planning, Course
Handbook Series, No. 11539, 2007). See generally Bradley T. Borden, The Federal Definition of
Tax Partnership, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 925 (2006).
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opt into corporate or partnership taxation even if there is a question
about the threshold issue of whether there is a separate entity.
156
Similarly, before applying the CTB regulations, there must be a
determination as to how many separate entities exist; 57 again, this
requirement was not changed by the CTB regulations.
Moreover, even though the CTB regulations made it easier for
taxpayers to achieve their desired entity classification, taxpayers
must still make the initial determination as to whether the corporate
tax regime or a pass-through tax regime is desired. The complexity
associated with that determination stems from the continued
existence of multiple different regimes for taxing business entities.
The Treasury acknowledges that this complexity remains despite the
adoption of the CTB regulations and further admits that the existence
of multiple tax regimes for business entities "may induce taxpayers
to alter their behavior, at the possible cost of other economic
business considerations, to obtain the maximum tax benefits or avoid
adverse consequences of one or another form."'58  Neither the
corporate resemblance test nor the CTB regulations (or any other
entity classification system) can avoid this inefficiency, distortion,
and complexity. The only likely opportunity to eliminate the source
of these problems is to unify the federal income tax's approach to
taxing business entities.
156. For example, if the owners of undivided fractional interests in property actually file a
CTB election, query whether that election might not be respected by the IRS even if, absent the
election, it was more likely than not that the arrangement did not constitute a "business entity."
Cf Rev. Proc. 2002-22, 2002-1 C.B. 733 (indicating that the IRS will not ordinarily issue a ruling
that undivided interests in property do not constitute interests in a business entity if the co-
ownership has filed a partnership or corporate tax return). A similar issue is presented if the
owners of the undivided fractional interests in property just contribute the interests in the property
to an LLC and then treat the LLC as a partnership for tax purposes.
157. This problem is illustrated by the attempt to apply the entity classification rules to a
Series LLC, which is a relatively new type of entity authorized by Delaware (and a few other
states). Much of the uncertainty with the classification of Series LLCs comes from the question
of defining the appropriate "separate business entity" (or entities) to which the CTB regulations
would apply. That is, the complexity appears to be in determining whether the entire LLC is a
single separate business entity, whether each series is a separate business entity, or whether the
LLC consists of an entity of entities. See, e.g., Michael E. Mooney, Series LLCs: The Loaves and
Fishes of Subchapter K, in 813 TAX PLAN. FOR DOMESTIC & FOREIGN PARTNERSHIPS, LLCS,
JOINT VENTURES & OTHER STRATEGIC ALLIANCES 355 (PLI Tax Law and Estate Planning
Course Handbook Series, No. 14290, 2008).
158. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 121, at 3.
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B. Transaction Costs, Efficiency & Equity
The simplicity and administrability improvements discussed in
Part III.A. 1 all reduce transaction costs, which was one of the
objectives that prompted the adoption of the CTB regulations.
159
Taxpayers no longer have to waste resources carefully designing
their business arrangements to satisfy the Kintner regulations' tax
factors. Additionally, the CTB regulations improve efficiency by
reducing the tax incentives to choose suboptimal business structures
or terms to achieve a particular tax classification. Further, the
certainty conferred by the CTB regulations eliminates the need to
analyze the consequences of subsequent transactions in light of the
possibility that an alternative entity classification could apply. These
changes may benefit small business owners in particular because of
the reduced premium placed on knowledge, sophistication, and
ability to afford advice for the careful tax planning that was needed
under the Kintner regulations. The reduced transaction costs allow
better allocation of resources otherwise spent on tax planning and
lower the hurdles to the formation of new business entities.
Similarly, the CTB regime allows the Service to allocate its limited
resources better because the CTB regulations make it easier for the
Service to determine an entity's classification; the Service no longer
has to spend time inquiring into the applicable state law and
particular business arrangements in order to determine whether a
majority of the Kintner corporate resemblance characteristics are
present.
That said, the increases in complexity described in Part.III.A.2
reduce the benefits otherwise created by the CTB regulations.
Commentators suggest that the existence of the election itself leads
to deadweight loss because of the unproductive time and money
spent weighing the alternatives and determining whether or not to
elect. 6 ' Although these problems are created because of the
159. See Simplification of Entity Classification Rules, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,989, 21,990 (proposed
May 13, 1996) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 301) (explaining that under the old regime, both
taxpayers and the IRS had to expend considerable time and resources on classification issues); see
generally JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 88, at 17 (citing lower compliance costs as one
of the principal intended impacts of the CTB regulations).
160. See George K. Yin, The Future of Taxation of Private Businesses, 4 FLA. TAX REV. 141,
149-50 (1999); GEORGE K. YIN & DAVID J. SHAKOW, REPS., AM. LAW INST., FEDERAL INCOME
TAX PROJECT: TAXATION OF PRIVATE BUSINESS ENTERPRISES AT 45-48 [hereinafter A.L.I.,
TAXATION OF PRIVATE BUSINESS ENTERPRISES].
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existence of different tax regimes under which businesses can be
taxed (and not because of the existence of the election itself), it is
true that taxpayers wishing to make the election must spend the time
and money preparing the election, 6' and the Service must spend time
processing the CTB election forms. 6 2  Nevertheless, only a small
percentage of entities actually make the CTB election,'63 so the
default rules seem to operate fairly effectively and efficiently. Even
so, as evidenced by the number of rulings issued,'" the Service
spends significant amounts of time and resources answering
questions about how the CTB entity classification rules work and
about how existing tax provisions apply in light of the CTB
regulations. Surely, some of these costs were mirrored by taxpayers
dealing with the same issues before and after the rulings.
In addition, as discussed below in Parts III.C. and III.D, the CTB
election allows for increased flexibility in choice of entity and in
structuring business transactions, and while this increased flexibility
may confer benefits, it also can lead to wasteful tax planning,
particularly with foreign entities. These tax planning opportunities,
along with both the need for taxpayers to decide whether taxation as
a corporation or as a partnership would be preferable and the growth
of the LLC as another business organization alternative, mean that
there continues to be a premium on obtaining knowledgeable,
sophisticated (and likely costly) tax and business advice.
161. I.R.S. Form 8832 estimates that although "[t]he time needed to complete and file this
form will vary depending on individual circumstances[, t]he estimated average time is:
Recordkeeping... 1 hr., 49 min., Learning about the law or the form... 2 hr., 7 min.[, and]
Preparing and sending the form to the IRS ... 23 min." Instructions for Entity Classification
Election, I.R.S. Form 8832 (rev. Mar. 2007), at 6. Approximately 326,333 valid CTB elections
were filed between 1997 and 2007, so using the time estimates stated on the CTB election form
(which vary depending on the particular taxpayer), taxpayers spent roughly 1.4 million hours
making CTB elections over the course of 11 years. I.R.S. Statistics of Income Division (June
2008) (unpublished data on file with author).
162. If the IRS takes at least as much time to process and acknowledge each CTB election
form as it is estimated to take a taxpayer to prepare and send the form to the IRS (23 minutes),
then in 2006 alone, IRS employees would have spent over 24,000 hours processing CTB
elections. Instructions for Entity Classification Election, I.R.S. Form 8832 (rev. Mar. 2007), at 6.
Again, this is a very rough estimate.
163. See supra notes 110-09.
164. See supra note 126.
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C. Flexibility & Neutrality
1. Business Operations
With the adoption of a largely elective entity classification
regime and the elimination of the multi-factor Kintner corporate
resemblance test, taxpayers using unincorporated entities became
free to agree to whatever management, liability, interest
transferability, and continuity terms they deem appropriate for
business purposes, without regard to the desired tax classification.'65
This additional freedom conferred by the CTB regulations reduces
the influence that the tax system wields on taxpayers' choice of
entity and choice of business terms. In turn, this increase in
neutrality may increase efficiency, in that taxpayers are freer to use
the type of entity that best fits their business needs, and taxpayers are
released from inefficient constraints on the terms governing that
entity.
66
This additional flexibility in business structuring, and resultant
neutrality and possible efficiency benefits contributed to the
increased use of LLCs. Freed from the tax constraints on the
business terms for LLCs and assured of certainty with regard to tax
classification, LLCs (which have the economic benefit under state
law of affording limited liability to all of their members) rapidly
became a popular choice for newly formed entities after the adoption
of the CTB regulations. The number of LLCs increased by 1,135.9
percent from 1995 (when the Service first announced that it was
considering an elective classification scheme) to 2005.167 Further, in
light of the CTB regulations, some states that had adopted "bullet
165. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 121, at 26 ("The Code generally affords
business enterprises and their owners the effective flexibility to elect one form or another without
varying any of the meaningful non-tax substantive relationships among an enterprise and its
owners."). Taxpayers still have to make decisions about these issues, but they can do so without
taking the tax consequences into consideration.
166. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
167. Tim Wheeler & Nina Shumofsky, Statistics of Income, Partnership Returns, 2005,
STATISTICS OF INCOME BULLETIN, FALL 2007, at 69, 75, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
soi/05partnr.pdf. See also JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 121, at 11. In comparison to
the meteoric rise in LLCs taxed as partnerships, over the same 1995-2005 period, the number of
limited partnerships increased by 40.1 percent, and the number of general partnerships decreased
37.5 percent. Wheeler & Shumofsky, supra. These counts only include LLCs that are treated as
partnerships for tax purposes. The increase in the number of LLCs would likely be much higher
if the counts also included LLCs that are treated as disregarded entities.
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proof' LLC statutes168 revised their LLC statutes to afford businesses
greater freedom in the terms of their LLC operating agreements,'69
commensurate with the freedom allowed under the CTB regulations.
Moreover, as greater numbers of businesses operated in LLCs, courts
spent more time interpreting the LLC statutes.17° And, as more state
business law regarding LLCs developed, prospective formers of
LLCs had increased amounts of information about the rights and
responsibilities associated with using LLCs and hence may have felt
more comfortable with that possibility.
Similarly, after the switch to an explicitly elective entity
classification regime that contemplated "disregarded entities," states
increasingly modified their LLC statutes to allow for single-member
LLCs. 17' With a relatively clear understanding of how single-
member LLCs would be treated for tax purposes,' businesses began
using single- and multi-member LLCs to deliberately create
corporate groups that more precisely reflected their business
operations. For example, a corporation could segregate the assets
and liabilities of its three different divisions into three different,
wholly-owned LLCs' 73 While some of this flexibility removes the
tax hurdles to creating optimal organizational forms,'74 it also poses
the threat of enabling wasteful tax planning.'75
2. Business Transactions
The entity classification certainty afforded by the CTB
regulations, particularly with respect to the treatment of disregarded
168. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
169. See, e.g., A.B. 2875, 207th Leg., 1996-97 Sess. (N.J. 1997).
170. See, e.g., CARTER G. BISHOP & DANIEL S. KLEINBERGER, LIMITED LIABILITY
COMPANIES: TAX AND BUSINESS LAW, 6.03 (2002) (discussing the development of case law
regarding piercing the corporate veil for LLCs).
171. See generally id. 7.09 (noting, among other things, that states like Kansas and
Michigan modified their LLC statutes after 1997 to allow single-member LLCs).
172. But see supra Part III.A.2.b.
173. Taxpayers also used single-member LLCs to create bankruptcy remote entities. See
generally BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 170, at 1.04[5]. Further, practitioners developed
strategies to use single and multi-member LLCs to achieve or break affiliation for purposes of the
consolidated return tax rules. See I.R.C. § 1504 (2007); Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-1 (as amended in
1999); see also Lawrence M. Axelrod, Consolidated Return Planning Opportunities Using LLCs,
in 813 TAX PLAN. FOR DOMESTIC & FOREIGN PARTNERSHIPS, LLCS, JOINT VENTURES & OTHER
STRATEGIC ALLIANCES 677 (PLI Tax Law and Estate Planning Course Handbook Series, No.
14290, 2008).
174. See supra note 97 (describing some inefficiencies).
175. See also supra Part III.B.
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entities, also increased flexibility in structuring business transactions.
Flexibility is not a virtue in and of itself, but flexibility in structuring
can confer policy benefits. As the Joint Committee on Taxation
noted, "The check-the-box regulations facilitate transactions that
could not usually be done (or could be done only in a convoluted or
expensive manner) under prior law, but now [under the CTB
regulations] may be accomplished more simply, efficiently or
cheaply."'76  Thus, the CTB regulations alleviate some of the tax
constraints that interfered with the effectuation of business
transactions in their optimal forms. An example involving corporate
divisions under Code section 355 may help illustrate this benefit.
For a corporate division to qualify as tax-free under Code
section 355, both the distributing corporation and the controlled
corporations must be engaged in the active conduct of a trade or
business immediately following the division.'77 When the CTB
regulations were adopted, a corporation could satisfy the "active
conduct of a trade or business" requirement only if the corporation
itself was directly engaged in the active conduct of a trade or
business or if the corporation was a holding company and
substantially all of its assets consisted of stock of controlled
corporations engaged in the active conduct of a trade or business.'
Because of this "active conduct of a trade or business" requirement,
businesses organized with a top-tier holding corporation often had to
alter their corporate structures in order to satisfy the requirement by,
for example, liquidating'79 one of the holding corporation's
subsidiaries so that, after the liquidation, the top-tier former holding
company was directly engaged in the conduct of an active business
and held the stock of the other lower-tier subsidiaries. One problem
with this restructuring approach was that it undermined the holding
company business strategy of having different aspects of the
conglomerated business segregated into different subsidiaries at the
same level (i.e., where each segregated business was on equal
176. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 88, at 18.
177. I.R.C. § 355(a)(1)(C), (b) (2007).
178. Id. § 355(b) (1996).
179. This result could also be accomplished by having the subsidiary merge upstream into the
top-tier holding corporation. Id. § 368(a) (2008).
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footing with the others, no business owned any other business, and
no business was structurally subject to the liabilities of another). 8 °
The treatment of single-member LLCs as disregarded entities
under the CTB regulations allowed the "active conduct of a trade or
business" requirement to be satisfied while preserving the business
benefits of the holding company structure. Specifically, rather than
having one of the subsidiaries liquidate or merge into the top-tier
holding company, the holding company could create a newly formed,
wholly-owned single-member LLC into which the (formerly
liquidating) subsidiary would merge. The merger of the subsidiary
into a single-member LLC wholly owned by the top-tier holding
corporation was treated, for tax purposes, as a merger of the
subsidiary into the top-tier holding corporation. 8' Further, since the
single-member LLC would be disregarded for federal tax purposes,
the top-tier holding company would be treated as directly operating
the active trade or business formerly conducted by the subsidiary,
thus satisfying the "active conduct of a trade or business"
requirement of Code section 355 while still achieving the business
goal of segregating the subsidiary's business for state law
purposes.'82 This result is in accord with the policy goals of Code
section 355 because the top-tier holding company operates (directly
or indirectly) an active business (regardless of whether the single-
member LLC is used) and because the use of the single-member
LLC makes it no more likely that the corporate division is a device
for distributing corporate earnings and profits. This conclusion is
validated by the recent changes to the "active conduct of a trade or
business" requirements that make it easier for businesses with
complex multi-entity structures to satisfy this requirement without
having to undertake formalistic restructurings that may be to the
business detriment of the enterprise.'83 Although this change to the
180. For purposes of this example, it is assumed that this holding company structure, which
segregates the different divisions of the business in different business entities at the same level is
the optimal structure for this business.
181. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2(b) (as amended in 2008).
182. While the optimal structure for the corporate division likely would not have involved any
restructuring at all, the CTB regulations and the availability of the single-member LLC allow the
corporate division to be undertaken in a business structure that preserves the benefit of the
holding company structure. Thus, while not the absolute best structure, the single-member LLC
is certainly better, from a business perspective, than the structure that was required prior to the
CTB regulations.
183. I.R.C. § 355(b)(3) (2007) (as amended by Pub. L. No. 110-72).
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"active conduct of a trade or business" requirement makes the use of
the single-member LLC merger technique less necessary, the CTB
regulations, which made the single-member LLC merger alternative
possible, effectively provided more flexibility in, and reduced the tax
hurdles to, accomplishing corporate divisions.
A similar story could be told about how single-member LLCs
increase business flexibility and decrease tax hurdles with respect to
tax-free reorganizations under Code section 368 and like-kind
exchanges under Code section 103 1.184 These uses of single-member
LLCs afford favorable tax treatment to business transactions, while
simultaneously making the tax law more neutral among business
transaction structures and increasing efficiency by removing the tax
barrier to structuring business transactions in accordance with the
exigencies of business. This is a positive development as long as
affording this favorable tax treatment does not lead to excessive tax
planning and does not violate the policy goals underlying the
applicable tax provisions. 5' Hence, in this sense, the CTB
regulations improve upon the Kintner regulations.
The flexibility conferred by the CTB regulations, however, does
more than just reduce tax hurdles to optimal business transaction
structuring; it also provides many planning opportunities. Numerous
articles have been written detailing the transactional opportunities
available in a CTB world.'8 6 The planning opportunities can lead to
wasted resources and may actually encourage the use of single-
member LLCs in situations where other entity forms may have been
preferable from a business perspective, thus reversing some of the
efficiency and neutrality benefits described above. Moreover, the
increased flexibility in structuring business transactions afforded by
184. See generally Mark J. Silverman & Lisa M. Zarlenga, Use of Limited Liability
Companies in Corporate Transactions, in 772 TAX STRATEGIES FOR CORP. ACQUISITIONS,
DISPOSITIONS, SPIN-OFFS, JOINT VENTURES, FINANCINGS, REORGANIZATIONS &
RESTRUCTURINGS 1059 (PLI Tax Law and Estate Planning, Course Handbook Series, No. 11569,
2007).
185. See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 88, at 18 (noting that the CTB regulations
afford greater transactional flexibility, but asserting that this result is only preferable if the
purpose of the underlying tax rules is not violated by applying them at the taxpayer's choice).
186. See, e.g., Warren P. Kean, M&A Transactions Involving Partnerships and LLCs,
Including Conversions, Mergers and Divisions, in 812 TAX PLAN. FOR DOMESTIC & FOREIGN
PARTNERSHIPS, LLCS, JOINT VENTURES & OTHER STRATEGIC ALLIANCES 471 (PLI Tax Law
and Estate Planning, Course Handbook Series, No. 14290, 2008) (discussing how diving or
combining partnerships or LLCs with other taxable entities will be taxed); Silverman & Zarlenga,
supra note 184, at 1059 (discussing the use of LLCs in corporate transactions).
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the CTB regulations could lead to potentially abusive tax planning if
affording favorable tax treatment is contrary to the policy goals of
the underlying tax provisions. The Service was aware of this risk
when the CTB regulations were adopted,'87 and this issue has proven
to be particularly problematic in the cross-border context (as
discussed below in Part III.D). Nevertheless, as long as
inappropriate treatment can be curbed by changing the underlying
partnership or corporate tax rules,18 the explicitly elective entity
classification system (and the benefits described herein) can and
should be retained, at least in the domestic context.
1 89
D. CTB Regulations as Applied to Foreign Entities
When initially considering an elective entity classification
regime, the Service noted that the tax classification analysis under
the Kintner regulations posed similar problems for foreign entities as
for domestic entities. 9 ° However, the Service expressed reservations
about applying an explicitly elective regime to foreign entities
because there are "a number of special considerations that arise in
the foreign area," including (1) the fact that under then-existing law
there was "no foreign organization that [was] automatically treated
as a corporation for federal tax purposes," (2) "the possibility of
inconsistent, or hybrid, entity classification," and (3) the concern that
"a purely elective approach could have a substantive effect on entity
classification by increasing taxpayers' flexibility to achieve their
desired classification of certain foreign organizations."' 9  The
Service solicited comments on the potential application of an elective
entity classification regime to foreign entities, 9 2  and many
commentators encouraged the Service to extend the application of an
187. See Simplification of Entity Classification Rules, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,989-90 (proposed
May 13, 1996) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 301); T.D. 8697, 1997-1 C.B. 215 (1996).
188. The Joint Committee on Taxation has proposed some such changes. See JOINT COMM.
ON TAXATION, supra note 88, at 27-56.
189. But see infra Part III.D (regarding foreign entities).
190. I.R.S. Notice 95-14, 1995-1 C.B. 297. In fact, the Service suggested that, under the
Kintner regulations, the classification determination for foreign entities was even more complex
than the classification determination for domestic entities because, for example, "the
classification of a foreign organization involves not only a review of organizational documents,
but also a thorough understanding of the controlling foreign law." Simplification of Entity
Classification Rules, supra note 187.
191. I.R.S. Notice 95-14, 1995-1 C.B. 297.
192. Id.
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:451
elective regime to foreign entities.'93 The Service ultimately decided
to make the classification of foreign entities elective but noted that
"Treasury and the IRS will continue to monitor carefully the uses of
partnerships in the international context and will take appropriate
action when partnerships are used to achieve results that are
inconsistent with the policies and rules of particular Code provisions
or of U.S. tax treaties.' 94 Shortly after the finalization of the CTB
regulations, the Joint Committee on Taxation echoed some of the
Service's concerns that "[p]otentially significant issues are raised by
the check-the-box regulations in the international context"'95 and
suggested that monitoring the application of the CTB regulations to
foreign entities may help to identify issues where the electivity
afforded by the CTB regulations "is inconsistent with the underlying
rational for any particular present-law rules that are affected."'96 In
such situations, the Joint Committee on Taxation suggested that "it
would be appropriate to consider addressing the issue, for example,
by eliminating the electivity of those rules or modifying the rules."' 97
As predicted, the Service revisited the application of the CTB
rules to foreign entities for a variety of reasons. One common reason
for revision was the need to add additional foreign entities to the
Treasury Regulation section 301.7701-2's list of per se foreign
corporations.'98  In addition, because "[t]he Service has had
significant difficulties administering the relevant provisions of the
tax law because the information reporting requirements still date
from a time when the substantive entity classification rules did not
contemplate disregarded entities,"'99 the Service created a new Form
8858 to obtain information from U.S. persons who own a foreign
disregarded entity, in the hope of "identify[ing] issues more
193. See, e.g., N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Tax Section, supra note 88 ("[T]he report strongly urges
that the elective classification system be extended to foreign entities."); ABA Tax Lawyers, supra
note 90.
194. T.D. 8697, 1997-1 C.B. 215 (1996).
195. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 90, at 19.
196. Id. at 21.
197. Id.
198. T.D. 9197, 2005-1 C.B. 985; T.D. 9235, 2006-1 C.B. 338; I.R.S. Notice 2004-68, 2004-2
C.B. 706 (dealing with certain European public limited liability companies); I.R.S. Notice 2007-
10, 2007-4 I.R.B. 354 (adding a Bulgarian entity); see also Rev. Rul. 2006-3, 2006-1 C.B. 276
(addressing treatment of certain Japanese entities).
199. I.R.S. Announcement 2004-4, 2004-1 C.B. 357.
Winter 2009] CHECKING IN ON "CHECK-THE-BOX"
efficiently, ensuring that the Service can better focus resources and
reduce exam cycle time. 2 °°
The Service also attempted to address substantive issues as well.
The Service tried to address the subpart F consequences of hybrid
arrangements,20 ' to curb "abusive transactions [some of which
involve the use of disregarded entities] that are designed to generate
foreign tax credits, 20 2 to thwart elective changes in the entity
classification of foreign entities where the change is made "merely to
alter the tax consequences" of a subsequent disposition of the entity
("check and sell transactions"), 23 and to prevent taxpayers from
using the entity classification election to effectuate "tax-avoidance
transactions" in which taxpayers import a loss but not the
corresponding gain. 2' These and other efforts undertaken by the
Service are indicative of the many issues encountered over the last
decade or so in applying the provisions regarding the taxation of
foreign income in the context of explicitly elective classification of
foreign entities. The majority of these issues come from the ability
to classify foreign entities as disregarded entities, and the threat
posed by these types of transactions may be significant given that
almost 70 percent of the CTB elections made by foreign entities are
elections to classify the foreign entity as disregarded.0
200. Id.
201. I.R.S. Notice 98-11, 1998-1 C.B. 433; T.D. 8767, 1998-1 C.B. 875 (both revoked by
I.R.S. Notice 98-35, 1998-2 C.B. 34). But see I.R.C. § 954(a)(6) (2007) (for a three year period,
enacting a look-through rule for determination of subpart F income, thereby possibly signifying
Congressional blessing of at least part of the way in which disregarded entities facilitate subpart F
tax planning). See generally Andrew H. Braiterman, Intragroup Transactions: The Kinder,
Gentler Subpart F, 115 TAX NOTES 567 (2007) (discussing whether the Service considered the
effects of subpart F); David R. Sicular, The New Look-Through Rule: W(h)ither Subpart F?, 115
TAX NOTES 349 (2007) (discussing the Service's attempts to amend Subpart F to address tax
planning that uses the check-the-box regulations).
202. I.R.S. Notice 2004-19, 2004-1 C.B. 606 (withdrawing I.R.S. Notice 98-5, 1998-1 C.B.
334); I.R.S. Notice 2004-20, 2004-1 C.B. 608.
203. I.R.S. Notice 2003-46, 2003-2 C.B. 53; I.R.S. Announcement 2003-78, 2003-2 C.B.
1172; Changes in Entity Classification: Special Rule for Certain Foreign Eligible Entities, 64 Fed.
Reg. 66,591-02; 1999-2 C.B. 670 ("extraordinary transaction" provisions withdrawn in 2003).
Cf Dover Corp. v. Commissioner, 122 T.C. 324, 353 (2004) (concluding that this "check- and-
sell" technique achieved the taxpayer's desired result of avoiding the creation of subpart F
income).
204. I.R.S. Notice 2007-57, 2007-29 I.R.B. 87.
205. I.R.S. Statistics of Income Division (June 2008) (unpublished data on file with author).
Of a total of 97,922 elections made by foreign entities, 68,218 such elections were made to
classify entities as disregarded. Id. See infra Appendix A, Figure 3 (illustrating the number and
type of CTB elections made by foreign entities from 1997 to 2007). The data does not explain
why these elections were made, so many of these elections may not pose the type of abuse
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Based on the foregoing, commentators generally conclude that
the application of the CTB rules to foreign entities is complex and
difficult to administer, and is revenue reducing as a result of
potentially inefficient tax planning activity that is contrary to the
objectives of the Code provisions for taxing foreign income.2"6 In
light of these issues, the Joint Committee on Taxation and numerous
other practitioner and academic commentators have argued for
revision of the entity classification rules as applied to foreign
entities. Specifically, the Joint Committee on Taxation found the use
of foreign disregarded entities sufficiently problematic that it
recommended that single-member foreign business entities be treated
as corporations (rather than disregarded entities) for federal tax
purposes.2"7 The American Bar Association explained that the Joint
Committee on Taxation's proposal:
would preclude: (1) disregarded entity planning to separate
income and credits in a disregarded parent structure, (2)
disregarded entity planning to permit a foreign entity to
incur debt from a related party and take a deduction for
foreign purposes without triggering subpart F, and (3)
check and sell transactions, [but] would not affect the use of
a local law partnership classified as a corporation for U.S.
tax purposes (a so-called "reverse hybrid") to separate
income and credits and other techniques that use
inconsistent classification with respect to local law pass-
through entities.0 8
The American Bar Association has made an even more
sweeping proposal to "classify a foreign business entity as a
corporation if the entity is subject to an entity-level income tax
(under U.S. foreign tax credit principles) under the law of its country
of tax residence," and otherwise, classify the foreign business entity
as a pass-through entity. 29 The American Bar Association proposal
problems discussed above. The sheer number of such elections, however, suggests that taxpayers
believe that there is something particularly desirable about having foreign entities classified as
disregarded from their owners. That level of attractiveness may be suspicious.
206. See, e.g., David A. Weisbach, Line Drawing, Doctrine, and Efficiency in the Tax Law,
84 CORNELL L. REV. 1627 n. 12 (1999).
207. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, OPTIONS TO IMPROVE TAX COMPLIANCE AND REFORM
TAX EXPENDITURES, No. JCS-02-05, at 182-85 (2005).
208. A.B.A., Report of the Task Force on International Tax Reform, 59 TAX LAW. 649, 669
(2006).
209. Id.
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aligns the U.S. tax treatment and the foreign tax treatment of
business entities in an effort to minimize deferral currently allowed
to foreign entities and to eliminate inconsistencies that arise from the
use of hybrids and reverse hybrids. While the Joint Committee on
Taxation and American Bar Association proposals differ, both
reduce the amount of electivity allowed in the classification of
foreign business entities, thereby reflecting the view of many
commentators21 that, despite the certainty and flexibility afforded
under the CTB regime, the elective nature of the CTB regulations as
applied to foreign business entities undermines the appropriate
application of the Subpart F and foreign tax credit regimes.
Accordingly, adopting one of these proposals may be appropriate
given that the risk of abuse enabled by the application of CTB
regulations to foreign entities seems to outweigh the benefits.
E. Fiscal Impact
When the CTB regulations were adopted, some commentators
2t'
concluded that the regulations were unlikely to significantly erode
the corporate tax base or substantially reduce tax revenues for a
variety of reasons, including: (1) that entity classification and the
imposition of corporate tax was already largely elective (at least for
the well-advised); (2) existing corporations were largely locked into
Subchapter C;212 (3) growing businesses typically need access to the
capital markets (which often required that they be structured and
taxed as corporations); 213 (4) the publicly traded partnership rules of
Code section 7704 protect the corporate tax base by treating certain
210. See, e.g., id. at 649 (reflecting the views of many commentators).
211. See, e.g., Hamill, Taxation, supra note 90, at 600. But see Sheffield, supra note 99, at
151 n.138.
212. To change from a C corporation to a partnership, the C corporation would actually have
to liquidate and pay corporate-level tax on the appreciation inherent in its assets. I.R.C. § 336
(2007). Alternatively, a C corporation could switch to a pass-through regime by electing to be
taxed as a Subchapter S corporation (assuming the corporation was eligible for such election) and
avoid the corporate-level tax on its appreciated assets, but only if the corporation was willing to
hold its assets for ten years to avoid the imposition of corporate-level tax on the built-in gains.
I.R.C. §1374.
213. Various investors, like tax-exempt investors and foreign investors, typically do not want
to invest in entities that are subject to flow-through taxation due to unrelated business taxable
income concerns (for tax-exempt investors) or effectively connected income concerns (for foreign
investors). I.R.C. §§ 511-512, 864(c), 871(b), 882 (2007). In contrast, investing in corporate
stock generally does not create the same problems because dividends and gain from sale of stock
are generally not UBTI or ECI. Id.
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partnerships as corporations; and (5) state corporate law was much
more well-developed than state LLC law (and hence, businesses
desiring limited liability may have been more comfortable using a
state law corporation rather than a state law LLC).
However, the passage of time erodes these reasons for
confidence in the continuing strength of corporate tax collections.
State LLC law has developed over the last decade as more LLCs are
formed and as disputes involving LLCs are adjudicated by courts;
21 4
this increases certainty about how LLC statutes apply and makes
businesses less reluctant to use LLCs. Further, pass-through entities'
access to capital markets is not as restricted as originally anticipated
because of strategies that allow tax-exempt entities and foreign
investors to invest in entities taxed as pass-throughs without fear of
unrelated business taxable income or effectively connected income,
and with minimal additional tax cost.215  Moreover, some
partnerships that are involved primarily in asset management and
investment in other companies have been able to access the public
markets without paying corporate tax despite the publicly traded
partnership rules.216
In addition, although C corporations in existence in 1996 were
largely locked into the corporate tax,217 entities formed beginning in
1997 could take advantage of the flexibility that the CTB regulations
provided with respect to the structuring of business operations. I
Since the mid-1990s, the number of new partnerships formed
214. See, e.g., BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 170, 6.03.
215. See, e.g., Adele M. Karig, Taxation of Tax-Exempt and Foreign Investors in U.S. Private
Investment Funds, in 756 TAX PLAN. FOR DOMESTIC & FOREIGN PARTNERSHIPS, LLCs, JOINT
VENTURES & OTHER STRATEGIC ALLIANCES 2007, at 331-42 (PLI Tax Law and Estate Planning
Course Handbook Series, No. 11539, 2007) (discussing corporate blocker strategies, including
leveraged blockers, for avoiding ECI and UBTI to enable investments in U.S. partnerships by
foreign investors and tax-exempt investors, respectively); see also Robert D. Blashek & Scot A.
McLean, Investments in "Pass-Through" Portfolio Companies by Private Equity Partnerships:
Tax Strategies And Structuring, in TAX PLAN. FOR DOMESTIC & FOREIGN PARTNERSHIPS, LLCS,
JOINT VENTURES & OTHER STRATEGIC ALLIANCES 2008, at 477, 546-92 (PLI Tax Law and
Estate Planning Course Handbook, Series No. 14290, 2008).
216. See The Blackstone Group L.P., Prospectus (Form 424B4), at 240-56 (June 21, 2007);
Fortress Investment Group LLC, Prospectus (Form 424B4), at 216-29 (Feb. 21, 2007). See
generally Victor Fleischer, Taxing Blackstone, 61 TAX L. REv. 89 (2008) (discussing a proposed
amendment to the publicly traded partnership rules in order to prevent entities like The
Blackstone Group L.P. and Fortress Investment Group LLC from avoiding taxation as
corporations).
217. See supra note 212.
218. See supra Part III.C.I.
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(including LLCs taxed as partnerships) significantly exceeded the
number of new C corporations formed, 2"9 and LLCs are the most
rapidly increasing entity type220 (increasing in number by over 1100
percent between 1995 and 2005).221 This growth rate in number of
businesses is largely mirrored by the growth rate in business receipts;
since the mid-1990s, LLCs taxed as partnerships experienced the
highest annual growth in business receipts. Moreover, as a
percentage of total business income, taxable income from C
corporations has declined, while income from pass-throughs has
increased, primarily as a result of the availability of the LLC as an
entity choice. 23  This data reflects an uptick in economic activity
conducted by pass-through entities in general, and in LLCs in
particular, as opposed to C corporations. Moreover, the Treasury
Department recently acknowledged that "[t]he importance of the
non-corporate business sector has grown substantially over time" 
224
and that "[c]ompared to other OECD countries, non-corporate
businesses play an unusually important role in the U.S. economy,"
both in number and in the magnitude of the economic activity of
such business. Together, this suggests that there may be merit in
the concern about the erosion of the corporate tax base as a result of
the increased use of unincorporated business entities.226
219. Kelly Luttrell et al., Integrated Business Data, 2003, in 47 I.R.S. STATISTICS OF INCOME
BUREAU 47, 53 (2006), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/03intbus.pdf.
220. Id.; see also Petska, supra note 54, at 13. As noted earlier, these counts only include
LLCs that are treated as partnerships for tax purposes. The increase in the number of LLCs
would likely be much higher if the counts also took into account LLCs that are treated as
disregarded entities for tax purposes.
221. Wheeler & Shumofsky, supra note 167, at 75-76. While still eclipsed by the number of
sole proprietorships and S corporations, LLCs represent the most numerous type of entity taxed
as a partnership. Id.
222. Petska, supra note 55, at 15-17.
223. Peter R. Merrill, The Corporate Tax Conundrum, 117 TAX NOTES 174 (2007). The ratio
of business income earned by C corporations to the business income earned by pass-throughs was
approximately 60:40 throughout the early to mid-1990s, but by 2004, the ratio shifted to
approximately 49:51. See also Ellen Legel et al., The Effects of Tax Reform on the Structure of
U.S. Business, in I.R.S., STATISTICS OF INCOME BUREAU 63, 67 (2007), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/03legal.pdf. The decline in corporate taxable income also likely
reflects, at least in part, the tax shelter phenomenon, which artificially reduced C corporation
taxable income.
224. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, TREASURY CONFERENCE ON BUSINESS
TAXATION AND GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS: BACKGROUND PAPER 3 (2007), available at
www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/07230%20r.pdf.
225. Id. at 16.
226. In addition, at least one commentator suggests that inappropriate revenue losses are at
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That said, the vast majority of CTB elections made by domestic
eligible entities actually choose corporate (and not partnership or
disregarded entity) tax classification,227 meaning that domestic
entities do not appear to be using the CTB election to flock to non-
corporate tax status228 (though they may be using the default rules in
the CTB regulation to do so). Some of these elections for entities to
be treated as corporations may be coupled with S corporation
elections, 29 such that the electing entities avail themselves of a pass-
through tax regime and avoid corporate-level tax, but S corporation
treatment was available prior to the CTB regulations. Thus, in this
sense, the existence of the election (as opposed to the existence of
the CTB regulation default rules) does not appear to contribute
significantly to the erosion of the corporate tax base. 23o
Moreover, corporate income tax revenue as a percentage of both
gross domestic product and total tax revenue was more than 20
percent higher in both 2006 and 2007 than it was in 1996. However,
corporate income tax revenue as a percentage of both gross domestic
product and total tax revenue declined slightly in the late 1990s and
dropped significantly between 2001 and 2003, before rising again
over the last few years. 231  Although there may be a variety of
explanations for these data trends, 32 this data233 may suggest that,
least part of the motivation behind the Service's moves to curtail the use of hybrid foreign
entities. See Weisbach, supra note 206, at n. 12; see generally supra Part III.D for a discussion of
the Service's actions regarding the use of the CTB election as applied to foreign entities.
227. See I.R.S. Statistics of Income Division (June 2008) (unpublished data on file with
author); see infra Appendix A, Figure 2 (illustrating the number and type of CTB elections made
by domestic entities from 1997 to 2007); see also supra note 120 and accompanying text.
228. However, entities electing corporate status may be trying to preserve the ability to
change to flow-through tax treatment easily.
229. See supra note 12 1.
230. The distinction between the use of the default rules and the election may be important to
the extent that one option for reforming the CTB regulations is to adopt a mandatory
classification regime in which the election is eliminated and the current default rules are made
mandatory.
231. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, HISTORICAL BUDGET DATA, available at
http://www.cbo.gov/budget/data/historical.shtml.
232. For example, the precipitous drop in corporate tax revenues between 2001 and 2003
could be explained, at least in part, by the difficult economic environment experienced by
corporations after 9/11 (rather than by businesses fleeing the corporate form), coupled with the
relative stability of social insurance tax collections. Similarly, the relative increase in corporate
tax revenue between 2005 and 2007 could be explained, at least in part, by the surge in the
economy during that period, coupled with lowered individual income and capital gains tax rates.
Additionally, the drop in corporate tax collections in the late 1990s and early 2000s followed by
an increase in such collections may also reflect corporate tax sheltering followed by increased
enforcement.
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even if the adoption of the CTB regulations caused some erosion of
the corporate tax base (as the late 1990s data may suggest), it has not
been particularly damaging to the fisc. Nevertheless, it is difficult to
estimate what the data would have been had the corporate
resemblance test not been eliminated. 34 Businesses that chose LLCs
might have opted for the limited liability protection of traditional C
corporations (in which case corporate tax revenue might have been
higher); they might have opted for a different pass-through entity (in
which case the owners might have had greater liability exposure,
235
but business revenues would still not have been subject to corporate
tax); and some businesses may not have been formed at all. Under
any alternative, efficiency might have suffered had the businesses
chosen a less appropriate business form or had the businesses used
an LLC that was inefficiently constrained in its business terms in an
effort to achieve partnership tax treatment under the Kintner
regulations.
F. Conclusion Regarding the CTB
Regulations, As Applied
For domestic entities, the result of this analysis leaves neither a
strong condemnation nor whole-hearted endorsement of the CTB
regulations. The CTB regulations are better than the four-factor
Kintner regulations, but there remains room for improvement in the
area of entity classification, particularly for foreign entities. For
domestic entities, a mandatory classification regime, in which the
election is removed and the current default rules are made
compulsory, could be slightly preferable to the current CTB
regulations because a mandatory regime preserves much of the
simplicity, administrability, and certainty benefits of the CTB
233. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 231. This data focuses on the trends
regarding corporate tax collections and implicitly assumes that investor-level taxation remains
steady. However, that is unlikely to be the case given that a profitable corporation can avoid
current shareholder-level taxation by retaining earnings, whereas a profitable pass-through entity
yields a current investor-level tax. Thus, the data may overstate relative declines in corporate tax
collections given that shifts to pass-through entities may increase the total tax collections
(including the investor-level tax collections) to which the corporate tax collections are compared.
234. Similarly, it is difficult to estimate what the data would have been had the CTB
regulations been enacted as mandatory rather than elective.
235. Increased liability exposure would not be a problem if the pass-through vehicle chosen is
an S corporation.
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regime, 236 but avoids the complications that stem from the
requirement to file the election237 and may reduce tax planning.238 A
mandatory regime may hinder flexibility and thus lessen the
neutrality benefits of the CTB regime,239  but making the
classification rules mandatory is unlikely to have a significant impact
on newly formed domestic entities given that the vast majority of
initial entity classification elections represent eligible entities
electing corporate tax treatment,24 ° which is easily obtainable through
the use of an incorporated entity. 41
However, all of these approaches to entity classification assume
that business entities do, in fact, need to be classified as either
partnerships or corporations for tax purposes. And, of course, this
classification remains necessary only as long as there are multiple
regimes for taxing businesses. Thus, the benefits of adopting a
mandatory classification system to replace the CTB regulations
would be limited because such a change still does nothing to address
the fundamental issue presented by the federal income tax's use of
multiple different regimes for tax businesses.
Moreover, the likelihood that Congress will resolve this problem
of multiple business tax regimes may have been adversely affected
by the mere promulgation of the CTB regulations. By providing an
elective entity classification regime (particularly for LLCs), the
Treasury allowed self-help integration, thereby enabling taxpayers
easier opportunities to lessen the sting of the corporate double tax.
As a result, the CTB regulations may have reduced taxpayers'
incentives to pressure Congress for a revision to the corporate double
tax, thus serving to entrench the multi-regime system for taxing
businesses.
236. See supra Part III.A.1.
237. See supra Part II.A.2.a.
238. For example, a mandatory regime makes changing entity classification more difficult.
See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
239. See supra note 131 and accompanying text; see supra Part III.C.
240. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(1) (as amended in 2008) and supra text accompanying
note 122. See also I.R.S. Statistics of Income Division (June 2008) (unpublished data on file with
author) and supra text accompanying notes 122.
241. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(1) (as amended in 2008). Particularly, to the extent that
the CTB regulations were being used for state tax planning purposes, it is hard to be sympathetic
to arguments against removing this benefit.
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IV. EXAMINING THE CTB ELECTION ITSELF
The foregoing discussed the CTB regulations as applied based
on their impact and suggested, at best, a lukewarm endorsement of
the CTB regulations for domestic entities only. However, for
purposes of evaluating the CTB regulations and the tax regimes into
which the regulations classify businesses, it is also helpful to analyze
the CTB election, in and of itself, from a more conceptual
perspective, asking why the regulations allow taxpayers to make an
explicit choice of business tax regime and seeking to understand the
election by analyzing the situations in which that choice is, and is
not, allowed.
A. Allowing an Explicit Election
Although commentators often criticize the use of explicit
elections in general,242 one commentator praised the Treasury's use
of an explicit election for entity classification on efficiency
grounds,243 arguing that an explicit election is a simple and efficient
approach to an otherwise difficult and costly exercise in drawing a
line between different regimes.2" This efficient line-drawing theory
is consistent with the Treasury's initial decision to replace the
Kintner regulations with the CTB regulations given that, when
considering the adoption of an explicitly elective approach to entity
classification, the Treasury cited the cost and difficulty of
differentiating between "virtually indistinguishable" business
entities."' However, the efficient line-drawing justification for the
use of an explicit election for entity classification suffers from the
same problem encountered in Part III: it assumes that there is a good
policy rational for the multiple different taxing regimes between
which the lines are drawn.246 Moreover, the Treasury's argument that
242. See, e.g., H. David Rosenbloom, Banes of an Income Tax: Legal Fictions, Elections,
Hypothetical Determinations, Related Party Debt, 26 SYDNEY L. REV. 17 (2004); Yin, supra note
87, at 130.
243. Weisbach, supra note 204, at 1630.
244. Id.; see also Abreu, supra note 150, at 493-94 (supporting a full embrace of the CTB
regulations in the interest of simplicity and administrability, even though this approach
necessarily foregoes "substantive accuracy"). This praise for the use of explicit elections assumes
that the baseline for comparison is a multi-regime world where the choice is implicit.
245. I.R.S. Notice 95-14, 1995-14 I.R.B. 7.
246. Cf Weisbach, supra note 206, at 1679 (stating that one important consideration in the
line-drawing analysis is "whether transactions are taxed appropriately when considered by
themselves (i.e., without regard to line drawing)"). See also supra Parts III.A.3, III.F and text
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the costs of differentiating between virtually indistinguishable
business entities justifies the adoption an elective approach for entity
classification 47 can be turned around and used to argue that if the
business entities really are virtually indistinguishable, the proper
course of action is to eliminate the existence of a multi-regime
business tax system, thereby obviating the need to distinguish the
virtually indistinguishable entities from each other. Thus, to justify
the CTB election as a simple and efficient approach to line-drawing
between business tax regimes applicable to virtually
indistinguishable forms of business, the existence of each separate
business tax regime must be defended. As many commentators have
argued, this has proven quite difficult.248
There are many other reasons why explicit elections are (and
should be) used in the federal income tax, and fundamentally, many
explanations, at some level, involve the concept of "sameness"-
where the substantive economics or facts of situations that merit the
application of one tax regime or another are sufficiently similar so as
to merit a choice between the applicable tax regimes.249 The flip side
to this is that the limitations on the availability of that choice should
define situations that are sufficiently different such that no choice
should be allowed. Thus, for an explicit election to be justifiable in
the affirmative (justifying the allowance of choice in situations
where choice is available), it must also be justifiable in the negative
(justifying the denial of choice in situations where choice is
accompanying notes 160-161.
247. Simplification of Entity Classification Rules, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,989, 21,990 (1996)
(proposed May 13, 1996) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 301).
248. See, e.g., American Law Institute, Federal Income Tax Project: Integration of the
Individual and Corporate Income Taxes: Reporter's Study of Corporate Tax Integration 21-40
(1993) (Alvin C. Warren, Jr., rep.) [hereinafter A.L.I., INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND
CORPORATE INCOME TAX]; U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, REPORT ON INTEGRATION OF THE
INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE TAX SYSTEMS: TAXING BUSINESS INCOME ONCE (1992); Joseph
M. Dodge, A Combined Mark-to-Market and Pass-Through Corporate-Shareholder Integration
Proposal, 50 TAX L. REV. 265, 266-67 (1995); Michael J. Graetz & Alvin C. Warren, Jr.,
Integration of Corporate and Individual Income Taxes: An Introduction, 84 TAX NOTES 1767,
1776 (1999); Daniel Halperin, Fundamental Tax Reform, 48 EMORY L.J. 809, 820-22 (1999).
But see, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Corporations, Society and the State: A Defense of the
Corporate Tax, 90 VA. TAX REV. 1193 (2004); Jeffrey L. Kwall, The Uncertain Case Against the
Double Taxation of Corporate Income, 68 N.C.L. REV. 613 (1990).
249. See Heather M. Field, Choosing Tax: Explicit Elections as an Element of Design in the
Federal Income Tax System, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. (forthcoming 2009). The concept of
"sameness" is inherent in the efficient line-drawing theory, in that, a reason it is difficult and
inefficient to draw lines based on substance and other "traditional concerns" is the similarity of
the factual scenarios involved.
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prohibited). Defending the boundaries of an election help defend the
election itself, and as much can be learned from the situations in
which the election is not allowable as can be learned from an
analysis of the application of the election in situations where it is
available. For example, by not allowing a Code section 338 election
in situations where less than 80 percent of the target corporation's
stock is purchased,250 the Code section 338 election (which, very
generally, allows a stock purchase to be taxed as an asset purchase)251
is limited to only those situations where a large enough amount of
target stock is purchased so as to make the stock purchase
economically similar to the purchase of the target's underlying
assets. Thus, even short of a comprehensive affirmative analysis of
where and when explicit elections are appropriate in the federal
income tax system, stress-testing the limitations of the explicit CTB
election should provide insight into the CTB election itself.
B. Examining the CTB Election by
Analyzing Its Limitations
As mentioned above, to be eligible to make a CTB election,
there must be an entity separate from its owner,252 the separate entity
must be a business entity (rather than a trust or entity otherwise
subject to special treatment under the Code),253 the entity generally
cannot have changed its tax classification in the previous five
years,254 and the entity must not be incorporated under state or federal
statute or otherwise be a per se corporation.255 Further, if a
partnership's interests are publicly traded, it generally does not have
a choice of entity classification;256 under the publicly traded
partnership rules, the entity generally will be treated as a corporation
unless an exception to those rules applies.257 These limitations (plus
250. I.R.C. §§ 338(a), (d)(3) (2007).
251. Id. §§ 338(a), (h)(10)(A) (2007).
252. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(a) (as amended in 2006).
253. Id. § 301.7701-2(a) (as amended in 2008).
254. Id. § 301.7701-3(c)(iv) (as amended in 2006).
255. Id. § 301.7701-2(b)(1), (3)-(8) (as amended in 2008). This limitation (unlike the
separate entity limitation, business entity limitation and limitation on changes in elective
classification) is required by the statute. See I.R.C. § 7701(a)(3) (2008) (defining "corporation").
256. I.R.C. § 7704(a) (2008). As with the limitation that incorporated entities cannot elect
their entity classification, the mandatory taxation of PTPs as corporations is imposed by the
statute, and not by the regulations.
257. Id. §§ 7704(a), (c) (2008).
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW [Vol. 42:451
a few other technical requirements regarding the time for filing and
the required signatories) establish the parameters for the CTB
election.258 To the extent that these limitations (such as the "separate
entity," "business entity," and limitation on changing elections) are
justifiable, that may help explain the rationale for the existence of the
election, but to the extent that the other limitations are difficult to
defend, the existence of the election and the choices provided
thereunder may be undermined.
1. Separate Entity
To apply the CTB regulations, there must be an entity separate
and distinct from its owner for federal tax purposes. 259  The
determination of whether a separate entity exists depends on federal
tax law and not state or local law; an entity can be created for federal
tax purposes through a contractual agreement or joint undertaking,
even without the formation of a local law entity. Similarly, the mere
formation of a local law entity is insufficient to create a separate
entity for federal tax purposes.26 °
Absent the existence of an entity for federal tax purposes, the
question of classification of that entity is irrelevant. The concept of
an "entity" is, however, an artificial construct, which need not be
employed if the relevant economic arrangement is otherwise easily
and appropriately taxed under general income tax principles.261
Accordingly, non-entities, like mere co-ownership arrangements,
mere cost sharing arrangements, and lessor/lessee arrangements,262
258. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-3(c)(1)-(2) (as amended in 2006).
259. Id. § 301.7701-1(a) (as amended in 2006).
260. Id.
261. Nevertheless, some proposals for taxing businesses contemplate applying a business tax
regime to sole proprietorships, which are generally not regarded as entities separate and apart
from their owners. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL
AND CORPORATE TAX SYSTEMS: TAXING BUSINESS INCOME ONCE (1992), available at
http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/tax-policy/library/integration-paper/integration.pdf ("examin[ing]
in detail several different integration prototypes"). Cf Edward D. Kleinbard, The Business
Enterprise Income Tax: A Prospectus, 106 TAX NOTES 97 (2005) (proposing an income tax
model that applies to all businesses uniformly, treating all businesses as "separate entities"
regardless of whether they are "organized as a corporation, a partnership, or an unincorporated
activity of an individual"). Note that, under the CTB regulations, sole proprietorships can
effectively opt-in to entity treatment and elect their tax classification. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-
1 (a)(4) (as amended in 2006).
262. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(a)(2) (as amended in 2006) (giving these as examples of
certain joint undertakings that may not give rise to entities for federal tax purposes). See
generally Bradley T. Borden, The Federal Definition of Tax Partnership, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 925,
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ought to be taxed as such and ought not to be subjected to the entity
classification regulations that would result in taxing the arrangement
as a business.263 Thus, the "separate entity" requirement is a
reasonable limitation on the CTB election: no election regarding an
entity's federal tax classification can or should be made without the
existence, for federal tax purposes, of the entity itself.
2. Business Entity
The CTB regulations only apply to business entities and not to a
variety of other types of entities that, for one reason or another, are
subject to a different taxing regime. The CTB regulations define the
term "business entity" in the negative: "a business entity is any entity
recognized for federal tax purposes ... that is not properly classified
as a trust under § 301.7701-4 or otherwise subject to special
treatment under the Internal Revenue Code.' '2 4
Trusts are excluded from the CTB regulations on the ground that
trusts are arrangements "whereby trustees take title to property for
the purpose of protecting or conserving it for the beneficiaries 265 and
do not involve "associates in a joint enterprise for the conduct of
business for profit. '266  The regulations make it clear that the
determination of whether an entity is treated as a trust (taxed
pursuant to Subchapter J) rather than as a business entity (subject to
the CTB regulations and taxed pursuant to Subchapter C, K, or S)
does not depend on the state law form of the entity or on the identity
of the persons who supply the assets to the entity.267 The key factors
in distinguishing between a trust and a business entity are whether
the entity has associates and whether the entity conducts a business
for profit,265 meaning that "business trusts' '26 are not treated as trusts
933-41 (2006) (discussing the differentiation between tax partnerships and other types of
business arrangements that do not rise to the level of creating a tax entity).
263. One nuance to this "separate entity" requirement involves the treatment of sole
proprietorships, which are generally disregarded as separate from their owners. A business
owned by a single owner, however, may choose to be treated as a separate business entity. Treas.
Reg. § 301.7701-1(a)(4) (as amended in 2006).
264. Id. § 301.7701-2(a) (as amended in 2008).
265. Id. § 301.7701-1(b) (as amended in 2006); id. § 301.7701-4(a) (as amended in 1996).
266. Id. § 301.7701-4(a) (1996).
267. Id. § 301.7701-4(b) (as amended in 1996).
268. Id. § 301.7701-1(b) (as amended in 2006); id. § 301.7701-4(b) (as amended in 1996).
269. Business trusts are arrangements known as trusts under applicable trust law but are
"created... as a device to carry on a profit-making business which normally would have been
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for federal income tax purposes but rather treated as business entities
and classified under the CTB regulations.27 Although it is not
always easy to make the distinction between an entity conducting a
business for profit and an entity created primarily from a gratuitous
transfer of assets that are to be protected or conserved for
beneficiaries, it does seem appropriate not to subject the latter type of
entity to a regime designed to tax businesses.27' Thus, there is no
need to give such an entity a choice among the regimes for taxing
businesses.
The CTB regulations also do not apply to certain other entities
subject to special treatment under the Code,7  such as regulated
investment companies ("RICs") 2" and real estate mortgage
investment conduits ("REMICs") 274 that are engaged in some degree
of business activity but that are afforded special (largely pass-
through) tax treatment if they satisfy certain limitations on the nature
of their operations. RICs and REMICs are fundamentally conduit
structures that are organized primarily to hold particular types of
investment assets and to facilitate ownership and investment by
individuals in those assets. The scope of allowable assets held and
income earned by these entities is sufficiently constrained to limit the
extent of their business activity, distinguishing them from general
businesses subject to taxation under Subchapters C, K, or S.
Moreover, the CTB regulations were enacted against the backdrop of
pre-existing policy decisions to afford special tax treatment to RICs
and REMICs.275 Thus, since these entities will not be subjected to
carried on through business organizations that are classified as corporations or partnerships under
the Internal Revenue Code." Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-4(b) (as amended in 1996).
270. Id.
271. See Boris I. Bittker & Lawrence Lokken, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES
AND GIFTS 1 85.5 (2008); see generally Steven L. Schwarcz, Commercial Trusts as Business
Organizations: Unraveling the Mystery, 58 Bus. LAW. 559 (2003) (discussing the use of trusts as
business entities).
272. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(b) (as amended in 2006); id. § 301.7701-2(a) (as amended in
2008). There are a number of types of entities that are subject to special treatment under the
Code, but are nevertheless within the scope of the CTB regulations. For example, insurance
companies are subject to special taxation rules as provided under Subchapter L of the Code, but
these entities are affirmatively classified as corporations pursuant to the CTB regulations. Id. §
301.7701-2(b)(4) (as amended in 2008).
273. See I.R.C. §§ 851-855 (2007).
274. See id. §§ 860(a)-860(g) (2007); see also T.D. 8697, 1997-1 C.B. 215 (specifically citing
REMICs as examples of entities not subject to classification under the CTB regulations).
275. See generally Richard M. Hervey, Taxation of Regulated Investment Companies, 740
TAX MGMT. PORTFOLIO, at Part 11 (2008) (providing historical background regarding the regime
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any of the general regimes for taxing businesses, these entities need
not be classified or given a choice of classification under the CTB
regulations. 76
Ultimately, since the CTB regulations classify entities as
generally subject to one of the regimes for taxing businesses, the
limitation of the CTB regulations (and the availability of the CTB
election) to entities engaged in business that are not otherwise
classified by the Code seems implicit.
277
3. Limitation on Ability to Electively
Change Classifications
When considering an elective entity classification regime, the
Service expressed concerns about the increased burden that could be
imposed on taxpayers and the Service if business entities had
complete freedom to elect to switch back and forth between different
classifications. 278  Accordingly, the final CTB regulations generally
restrict the ability of an entity to make an elective change in its entity
classification more than once in a sixty-month period. 9
This sixty-month limitation increases the administrability of the
entity classification system by limiting the frequency of elective
changes in classification. Over 96,000 elections to change an
entity's classification have been filed since 1997, representing
approximately 30 percent of all CTB elections filed 8.2 " That number,
for taxing RICs); Gary J. Silversmith, REMICs, FASITs and Other Mortgage-Backed Securities,
741 TAx MGMT. PORTFOLIO, at Part III & Worksheet 2 (2008) (explaining the tax rules regarding
REMICs and providing legislative history behind such rules).
276. While these entities are not afforded an explicit election under the CTB regulations, they
do take advantage of an implicit election. By structuring their affairs to meet the RIC or REMIC
rules, the entities opt into these taxing regimes and out of the CTB regulations.
277. It may be advisable to allow a broader collection of entities to choose their non-business
tax classifications (an issue not addressed by this Article), but the choices afforded should be
narrowly targeted so that the possible taxing regimes bear a substantive relationship to the entities
provided with a choice. Here, entities engaged in business activity can elect among regimes
intended to tax businesses. Admittedly, other entities that are engaged in some degree of business
are denied their choice of classification under the CTB regulations, but that is because such
entities, by structuring their affairs to meet the requirements of specific rules (such as the RIC or
REMIC rules), affirmatively make an implicit election of their tax treatment and thus have no
need for the CTB regulations.
278. I.R.S. Notice 95-14, 1995-1 C.B. 297.
279. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(c)(1)(iv) (as amended in 2006); see also Simplification of
Entity Classification Rules, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,989, 21,996 (1996) (proposed May 13, 1996) (to be
codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 301); T.D. 8697, 1997-1 C.B. 215 (1996).
280. I.R.S. Statistics of Income Division (June 2008) (unpublished data on file with author).
See infra Appendix A, Figures 2 & 3 (illustrating the number of initial elections and status change
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and the costs borne by the Service in processing CTB elections and
tracking entities' classifications, would likely be higher absent the
restriction on changes in entity classification.
Moreover, the restriction on elective classification changes
serves an anti-abuse function. Under the Kintner regulations, an
entity could change its classification by modifying the terms of its
operating agreement to contain greater or fewer corporate-like
characteristics. 28 ' Although this change was not particularly difficult,
it had substantive implications. The CTB regulations eliminated any
need to change the underlying business arrangement to change the
entity's classification for tax purposes, making it even easier for an
entity to change its classification. The CTB regulations' removal of
these barriers to changing an entity's classification lessened the
"frictions" that could help stymie inefficient and potentially abusive
tax planning.282 As a result, under a completely elective system
without limits on the frequency of classification changes, an entity
could make a series of elections to try to coordinate its status as a
corporation or a partnership with its tax attributes. For example, the
entity might elect to be classified as a partnership in years where it
expects to have significant tax losses, so that the losses could be
passed through and currently used by its high tax-bracket partners.
Then the entity might elect to be classified as a corporation in years
where it expects to have relatively low income, in order to take
advantage of low corporate rates for the first $50,000 to $75,000 of
income283 (i.e., to obtain the benefits of income splitting). Of course,
changing an entity's classification does have consequences: 284 a
corporation that elects to be classified as a partnership is deemed to
liquidate, which could create significant current tax costs; 28 5 a
partnership that elects to be classified as a corporation is deemed to
incorporate, but a deemed incorporation is unlikely to trigger current
taxation. 286 However, in the limited circumstances where the deemed
elections for domestic and foreign entities filing CTB elections from 1997 to 2007).
281. See supra Part II.A (discussing the Kintner regulations).
282. David M. Schizer, Frictions as a Constraint on Tax Planning, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 1312
(2001).
283. 1.R.C. § 11 (b) (2006).
284. Treas. Reg. § 3 01. 7 701-3(g) (as amended in 2006).
285. See I.R.C. §§ 331, 336 (2006) (requiring, upon the liquidation of a corporation,
recognition of gains and losses at both the corporate level and the shareholder level).
286. See id. § 351 (2006). Absent the receipt of boot, the incorporation of a partnership is
Winter 2009] CHECKING IN ON "CHECK-THE-BOX"
incorporation or deemed liquidation can be timed to minimize tax
liability caused by such change, the ability to switch back and forth
between corporate and partnership taxation could facilitate tax
avoidance. Thus, the sixty-month limitation on an entity's ability to
change classification limits potential abuse, in addition to serving an
administrability purpose. 87 Thus, like the "separate entity" and
"business entity" limitations, the sixty month288 limitation seems
appropriate and helpful for the process of classifying entities and
administering the business tax regimes.
4. No Election for Entities Incorporated Under
State or Federal Statute
The CTB regulations deny a choice of entity classification for
any "business entity organized under a Federal or State statute ... if
the statute describes or refers to the entity as incorporated or as a
corporation, body corporate, or body politic" '289 ("incorporated
entities") and for a number of other specifically enumerated types of
entities.9 ' The Code mandates this result for incorporated entities,29'
generally tax-free. Id.
287. The sixty-month limitation on elective entity classification changes is not absolute. The
regulations grant to the Commissioner, and the Commissioner has exercised, the discretion to
allow elective changes in entity classification within sixty months if more than half of the
interests in the entity as of the effective date of the change are owned by persons that did not own
any interests in the entity as of the effective date of the entity's prior election. Treas. Reg. §
301.7701-3(c)(1)(iv) (as amended in 2006); see, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2006-03-021 (Jan. 20,
2006). Moreover, the sixty month limitation in the CTB regulations merely limits explicitly
elective changes in entity classification; it does not preclude an entity from changing its entity
classification by actually undertaking the formal legal steps to change its status, for example, by
actually distributing its assets to its owners in liquidation and having its former owners contribute
the assets to a newly formed (and differently classified) entity.
288. One could argue that the limitation period should be longer or shorter, but a sixty-month
period seems reasonable given that this same five year period is used elsewhere in the Code for
similar purposes. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1366(g) (2007) (providing that, if an S corporation's election
terminates, the corporation is not eligible to re-elect S corporation status for 5 years), I.R.C. §
856(g)(3) (2006) (same with respect to a REIT election); see also id. § 1202 (2006) (requiring a
five-year holding period for the partial exclusion of gain from the sale of qualified small business
stock).
289. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(1) (as amended in 2008). Prohibiting incorporated entities
from electing their tax classification places significant pressure on the specific language of the
applicable state or federal statute, meaning that state legislatures can amend their business statutes
giving more and more corporate rights and responsibilities to entities that are not technically
"incorporated" under the statute. See Yin, supra note 87, at 134. This process further narrows
the substantive differences between incorporated and unincorporated entities, making it even
harder to justify mandatorily classifying the former as corporations while allowing the latter to
choose their business tax regime.
290. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(1), (3)-(8) (as amended in 2008). While choice of entity
classification is denied for a number of types of entities other than incorporated entities, the
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and hence, the CTB regulations automatically classify these entities
as corporations for federal income tax purposes.
Incorporated entities can avoid the double corporate tax by
electing to be treated as Subchapter S corporations, but many
incorporated entities are ineligible to make a Subchapter S election
given that the Subchapter S election is available only if the
incorporated entity has fewer than a hundred shareholders, only one
class of stock, and no nonresident alien or other ineligible
shareholders. 2 2  Further, the flow-through tax regime imposed by
Subchapter S differs in significant respects from the flow-through tax
regime imposed on partnerships by Subchapter K.293 There is debate
about whether the existence of the multiple pass-through business tax
regimes should be retained.294 However, as long as both Subchapter
S and Subchapter K persist, the mere availability of one version of
pass-through tax treatment for a subset of incorporated entities under
Subchapter S should not in and of itself cause all incorporated
entities to be denied the ability to make the CTB election (i.e.,
between Subchapter C and pass-through treatment under Subchapter
K) available to most other business entities.
Thus, there must be another explanation as to why incorporated
business entities are sufficiently different from business entities that
can choose their tax classification under the CTB regulations, such
that a choice of entity classification should be denied to per se
corporations. Historical development of the regimes for business
taxation may help explain how it came to be that incorporated
entities are mandatorily taxed as corporations under the current
entity classification rules, 295 but that path-dependent story does not
discussion here focuses on the denial of choice based on incorporation under federal or state law.
291. I.R.C. § 7701(a)(3) (2006).
292. I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1) (2008).
293. See generally JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 121, at 31-36 (describing
principal differences between the taxation of partnerships and S corporations, including the
treatment of business liabilities, the limitations on the type of interests, and the number of
investors in the enterprise).
294. See generally id. at 44-46 (discussing the possibility of unifying the regime for taxing
pass-through business); see A.L.I., TAXATION OF PRIVATE BUSINESS ENTERPRISES, supra note
160, at 125-272.
295. The federal income tax's treatment of business evolved over time, dating back to when
there were fewer types of entities and there was a brighter (albeit still artificial) line between
entities and aggregates. With the multiple regimes for taxing businesses in place, business
entities evolved, and many developments introduced additional flexibility in the terms and
organizational structures of business entities. See, e.g., Hamill, Story of LLCs, supra note 47 and
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explain why incorporated entities should be treated differently than
other business entities. 96  Arguments based on normative and
positive theories explaining the corporate double tax297  may,
however, be useful in analyzing whether the double corporate tax
should be mandatorily imposed on incorporated entities. 298  The
denial of entity classification choice for incorporated entities may be
justified if the rationale supporting the double corporate tax in
general is particularly persuasive in the context of incorporated
entities. 299 Accordingly, a brief description of several theories of the
corporate tax. and a discussion of each theory's ability to justify the
mandatory imposition of the corporate tax on incorporated entities
are set forth below. It is important to note that the below discussion
is not intended as a critique of the various theories offered to explain
the corporate tax, nor is the discussion intended to argue for or
against one such theory or another. The inquiry is primarily intended
to ask whether, if credence is given to the particular theory, that
theory can explain why the corporate tax is levied mandatorily on
incorporated entities and only levied on other entities at their option.
As the below discussion demonstrates, however, attempts to
justify mandatory corporate taxation for incorporated entities have
been largely unsuccessful. Accordingly, it is difficult to explain why
accompanying text. The tax rules developed in tandem with the evolving business entities, and
thus the CTB regulations are only one page in the long story of the taxation of business. That is,
the mandatory taxation of incorporated entities as corporations may be less a product of deliberate
design and more a product of a series of developments along a path chosen years ago.
296. This critique does not fault the Treasury with deciding to tax incorporated entities as
corporations; the responsibility for that decision falls on Congress. Note, however, that neither
the proposed nor the final CTB regulations explain why incorporated entities should be denied the
choice of entity classification. Simplification of Entity Classification Rules, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,989
(1996) (proposed May 13, 1996) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 301); T.D. 8697, 1997-1 C.B.
215 (1996).
297. Some commentators have questioned the extent to which the corporate tax regime
practically imposes a "double" tax. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 13, at 887. This discussion,
however, assumes that there is generally some adverse economic impact from being subjected to
the corporate tax regime, even if it is not an imposition of two full layers of taxation.
298. There is an extensive body of literature that criticizes the double corporate tax, and very
little literature that argues in favor of the corporate tax. See supra note 248.
299. Commentators have argued that conduit taxation is the natural way to tax businesses.
See, e.g., Bradley T. Borden, The Aggregate-Plus Theory of Partnership Taxation, 43 GA. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2009). Accordingly, this argument focuses on arguments that support the
deviation from the aggregate/conduit approach.
300. The literature contains a number of additional theories that either positively or
normatively explaining the corporate tax. In this discussion, however, I try to address the theories
most likely to provide some explanation for the CTB election's limited availability.
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incorporated entities should be denied the ability to choose their
entity classification under the CTB election while other very similar
business entities are allowed to elect their applicable business tax
regime.
a. Entity Theory
Under the entity theory, a corporation is treated as a distinct
taxpayer in its own right, separate and apart from its owners, and
thus should be subject to tax.3"' While the entity theory does not
necessarily have to result in double taxation,0 2 the concept of the
firm as a distinct taxpayer contributed, at least in part, to the
development of a tax scheme that imposes two layers of tax.3
Scholars differ as to the extent to which they believe that the entity
theory explains the existence of the corporate double tax,3" but even
crediting the entity theory fails to explain why the double tax should
apply only to incorporated and not unincorporated entities. While
the entity theory may have prevailed with respect to corporations and
not partnerships based on Congress's historical concept of the
differences between the types of firms,30 5 such differences are largely
eliminated today; entities like limited partnerships and LLCs can
have historically "corporate" characteristics like limited liability, free
transferability of interests, continuity of life, and centralized
management, and partners might not be actively involved in the
partnership's business or be responsible for the partnership's debts.
Similarly, a populist version of the entity theory focuses on the idea
that "the public views corporations as distinct entities, not merely as
vehicles for transferring profits to shareholders.""3 6 However, again,
this explanation easily could be extended to include unincorporated
301. See generally Steven A. Bank, Entity Theory as a Myth in the Origins of the Corporate
Income Tax, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 447, 465-504 (2001) (explaining the entity theory of
corporate taxation).
302. See A.L.I., TAXATION OF PRIVATE BUSINESS ENTERPRISES, supra note 160, at 68
(explaining that taxation at the entity level without double taxation requires a strategy of
corporate integration).
303. See id. at 36-40; William A. Klein, Income Taxation and Legal Entities, 20 UCLA L.
REV. 13, 54 (1972) (understanding the corporation as a distinct person was "a significant element
in the public's support of the law imposing the [corporate] tax"). Cf Bank, supra note 301.
304. See, e.g., Bank, supra note 301.
305. See Marjorie E. Komhauser, Corporate Regulation and the Origins of the Corporate
Income Tax, 66 IND. L.J. 53, 57-62 (1990).
306. Jennifer Arlen & Deborah M. Weiss, A Political Theory of Corporate Taxation, 105
YALE L.J. 325, 331 (1995).
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entities as well, given that, as evidenced by the public outcry
regarding the taxation of carried interests, the public may not draw a
meaningful tax distinction based on organizational form.3"7 Thus,
even if the entity theory (or a populist version thereof) explains the
development of the double tax, it has trouble explaining why the
double tax should apply mandatorily only to incorporated entities,
while most other business entities have the freedom to choose
whether or not to be subject to the double tax.
b. Benefits Theory
Benefits justifications for the corporate tax generally "posit that
certain entity organizational structures allow participating taxpayers
to achieve benefits that could not be achieved (either at all or at
comparable costs) absent the utilization of the structure.""3 There
are a variety of benefits conferred by the use of an incorporated
entity, including limited liability, liquidity through the public
markets, and access to particular types of capital. Hence, the
corporate tax could be viewed as a "fee" for those benefits and for
the incremental returns derivable from conducting economic activity
in those entities.30 9
Incorporated entities generally protect their owners from
personal liability for the entities' debts. However, the benefit of
limited liability does not explain the current system that denies
307. See, e.g., Jenny Anderson & Andrew Ross Sorkin, Tax Gap Puts Private Equity Firms
on the Hot Seat, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2007, at Cl; Paul Krugman, An Unjustified Privilege, N.Y.
TIMES, July 13, 2007, at A19; see generally JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, PRESENT LAW AND
ANALYSIS RELATED TO THE TAX TREATMENT OF PARTNERSHIP CARRIED INTERESTS, No. JCX-
41-07 (2007); JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, PRESENT LAW AND ANALYSIS RELATING TO TAX
TREATMENT OF PARTNERSHIP CARRIED INTERESTS AND RELATED ISSUES, PART 1, No. JCX-62-
07 (2007); JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, PRESENT LAW AND ANALYSIS RELATING TO TAX
TREATMENT OF PARTNERSHIP CARRIED INTERESTS AND RELATED ISSUES, PART II, No. JCX-63-
07 (2007). Part of the issue spurring on the perceived unfairness in the treatment of holders of
carried interests in a fund is that the same level of tax is not paid on the fund's earnings and the
carried interest holder's earnings as is paid by a corporation and its owner-managers on the
corporation's earnings. But see Steven A. Bank, A Capital Lock-in Theory of the Corporate
Income Tax, 94 GEO. L.J. 889, 890-91, 897, 943 (2006) (suggesting that the public may
distinguish between corporations and partnerships).
308. Herwig J. Schlunk, I Come Not to Praise the Corporate Income Tax, But to Save It, 56
TAX L. REV. 329, 338 (2003).
309. Alvin C. Warren, The Corporate Interest Deduction: A Policy Evaluation, 83 YALE L.J.
1585, 1600 (1974) ("A separate tax on corporate income is sometimes considered appropriate
because of the privileges and benefits granted corporations by the state, .... such as limited
liability for investors ...."); see also Schlunk, supra note 308, at 338 (discussing "whether the
corporate income tax is a plausible fee for a benefit" provided by the government).
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incorporated entities the choice of entity classification, given that
other entities, such as LLCs, whose owners are also protected from
the entity's liabilities, can elect their tax classification. Moreover,
the Service considered and explicitly rejected using limited liability
as the key factor distinguishing entities that should be taxed as
corporations from entities that should be taxed as partnerships,"' and
the Treasury now freely admits that "[a]s a general matter, it is not
possible to relate the differences in the tax consequences that attend
doing business in different legal entity forms to any substantive non-
tax attributes of those legal forms." '311 The American Law Institute
("ALI") reached a similar conclusion that taxation of business
entities should not turn on the existence or absence of limited
liability.3"2 In arriving at this conclusion, the ALl explained that "the
income tax is not a tax on 'benefits conferred,"' any additional tax on
such a benefit conferred "would not, in any event, measure properly
the value of the benefit obtained," "limited liability is an efficient
characteristic for firms," and "[a] classification rule based on limited
liability would also raise difficult implementation questions.""3 3
Moreover, query why the federal government should be entitled to
extract a tax on the benefit of limited liability that is actually
conferred by the state governments.
In addition, while most publicly traded entities are structured as
incorporated entities (and setting aside arguments based on optimal
tax theory for a moment),314 the benefit of liquidity through public
trading also does not explain the current system where incorporated
entities are unable to elect their tax classification, given that many
incorporated entities are not publicly traded (like Koch Industries,
Inc. and Mars, Incorporated)" 5 but are still denied the choice of
310. 45 Fed. Reg. 75,709 (Nov. 17, 1980) (proposing regulations that provided that "an
organization in which no member has personal liability for the debts of the organization be
classified as an association taxable as a corporation"); I.R.S. Announcement 83-4, 1983-2 I.R.B.
31 (withdrawing the proposed regulations).
311. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, TAX REFORM: SELECTED FEDERAL TAX ISSUES RELATING
TO SMALL BUSINESS AND CHOICE OF ENTITY, No. JCX-48-08, at 26 (2008) (noting an exception
that "access to the public equity markets must generally be through a C corporation").
312. A.L.I., TAXATION OF PRIVATE BUSINESS ENTERPRISE, supra note 160, at 55-56.
313. Id. But see Jeffrey A. Maine, Linking Limited Liability and Entity Taxation: A Critique
of the ALI Reporters' Study on the Taxation of Private Business Enterprises, 62 U. PITT. L. REV.
223 (2000) (arguing in favor of determining tax classification based on limited liability).
314. See infra Part IV.B.4.c.
315. The companies were two of the top ten largest private companies in the United States in
2007. FORBES, SPECIAL REPORT - AMERICA'S LARGEST PRIVATE COMPANIES (Shlomo
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business tax regime, while some unincorporated entities (like The
Blackstone Group L.P. and Fortress Investment Group LLC)316 are
publicly traded but are allowed to elect their tax classification."7
Similarly, while incorporated entities historically have been most
attractive to capital investments from tax-exempt and foreign
investors,3"' it is also difficult to justify the denial of the entity
classification election to incorporated entities on the basis of the
benefit of access to capital, given that LLCs and other entities that
can elect their tax classification can also access capital from these
investors with minimal tax cost.319
Moreover, a policy that denies incorporated entities a choice of
tax classification and mandatorily taxes them as corporations on
either a "public trading" basis or an "access to capital" basis suffers
from many of the same weakness as distinguishing these entities
based on the benefit of limited liability. These approaches
effectively impose corporate-level tax on incorporated entities in
exchange for "benefits conferred," and even if the corporate tax is
(and should be) a tax on benefits conferred (a position rejected by
many scholars), the additional corporate-level tax is unlikely to
accurately measure the value of these benefits, may discourage
efficient transactions/investments, and could be difficult to
implement. Accordingly, limited liability, liquidity through public
trading, and access to capital-while all benefits common to many
incorporated entities-do not and should not justify denying the
entity classification election to incorporated entities.
Reifman, ed. 2007), http://www.forbes.com/2007/11/08/largest-private-companies-biz-
privates07-cx sr 1108privateland.html.
316. The Blackstone Group L.P., supra note 216, at 240-56; Fortress Investment Group LLC,
supra note 216, at 216-29.
317. See also infra Part IV.B.5 (discussing further the relationship between "public trading"
and entity classification).
318. See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
319. Tax-exempt investors and foreign investors can invest in pass-through vehicles via
corporate "blocker" entities. Then, the investor owns only stock or debt of a corporation, which
does not generate UBTI or ECI, and the corporation owns the direct ownership interest in the
pass-through vehicle. The tax cost of this blocker structure is minimized to the extent that the
corporate blocker is capitalized with a significant amount of debt (interest on which is
deductible). See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
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c. Optimal Tax Theory
One key normative argument in favor of the double tax on
corporations is that it imposes a higher tax burden on a relatively
inelastic feature of business and is thus an efficient way to raise
revenue.3 21 In order for optimal tax theory to support the mandatory
imposition of the double tax on incorporated entities, the demand for
incorporated entities must be relatively inelastic. However,
particularly as LLCs gain greater acceptance, the demand for
incorporation appears to be becoming more elastic; the data
comparing the rate of formation of C corporations to the rate of
formation of entities taxed as flow-throughs documents a shift away
from incorporated entities, likely spurred on by a difference in the
tax regimes.3 2' Thus, the benefit of incorporation itself (as opposed
to incorporation as a proxy for public trading or access to capital)
may not be sufficiently in demand such that a higher tax burden
could be imposed with minimal distortion.
Nevertheless, optimal tax theory may present a reasonable case
for imposing higher tax burdens on entities that are publicly traded
because public trading is a relatively inelastic feature of business.322
Even so, imposing a higher tax on publicly traded entities will still
affect the price that investors are willing to pay for equity
investments.323 Moreover, as it becomes easier to raise significant
amounts of capital through private markets,324 the argument for
mandatorily subjecting publicly traded corporations to the double
corporate tax weakens. Additionally, even if optimal tax theory
supports the imposition of a higher tax on publicly traded entities, the
imposition of the higher tax on all incorporated entities is
overinclusive given that many incorporated entities are not publicly
320. See, e.g., Terrence R. Chorvat, Apologia for the Double Taxation of Corporate Income,
38 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 239, 255-56, n.34 (2003) (discussing optimal tax theory as a defense
for the corporate tax and citing F.P. Ramsey, A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation, 37 ECON.
J. 47, 58-59 (1927)).
321. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, TAX REFORM: SELECTED FEDERAL TAX ISSUES RELATING
TO SMALL BUSINESS AND CHOICE OF ENTITY, No. JCX-48-08, at 3-4, 6-9 (2008); see also
Merrill, supra note 223 (discussing the ratio of business earned by C corporations to business
earned by pass-throughs).
322. See Yin, supra note 87, at 132-33.
323. See Chorvat, supra note 320, at 255-56.
324. See Ronald J. Gilson & Charles K. Whitehead, Deconstructing Equity: Public
Ownership, Agency Costs, and Complete Capital Markets, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 231 (2008).
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traded.3 25 The existence of private incorporated entities that do not
restructure into entities taxable as pass-throughs may lead some to
suggest that there is some other benefit of being incorporated,
beyond public trading, upon which higher tax can be imposed
efficiently. However, many of these private incorporated entities
were formed before the CTB regulations and are locked into
Subchapter C because they are ineligible for Subchapter S, because
of the huge built-in gain that they would have to recognize were they
to liquidate and then reform as an LLC or because of the significant
transaction costs of such a restructuring.326 Query whether optimal
tax theory does or should mandate the imposition of a higher tax
burden on entities because of their desire to avoid those extra tax and
non-tax costs of restructuring. Thus, optimal tax theory has trouble
explaining why a higher tax burden should mandatorily be imposed
on all incorporated entities.
d. Capital Lock-In/Agency Theory
Another suggested explanation for the corporate income tax is
the "capital lock-in theory." Under this explanation, given the
delegation of substantial control over assets to the board of directors
and given shareholders' limited rights to corporate assets,
corporations are more successful than unincorporated entities at
protecting business capital for use in future growth and at preventing
"hold-up" by individual owners demanding a return of their
investment.3 27 The corporate income tax actually protects this ability
of managers to accumulate wealth inside the corporation (which is
considered under the capital lock-in theory to confer long-term
benefits to the business and its owners), while still imposing some
tax.
328
A more cynical variation on this theory is that the persistence of
the corporate tax derives from the agency relationship between
corporate managers and shareholders.
In its strongest articulation, double taxation becomes an ally
of corporate management because it helps persuade
shareholders to allow managers to retain earnings and
325. See supra note 315 and accompanying text.
326. See I.R.C. § 336 (2007).
327. See Bank, supra note 307 at 892, 914 n.149, 945.
328. Id.
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invest them free of substantial monitoring. Stated more
moderately, fighting double taxation is of considerably
lower value to managers than trying to secure research and
investment credits.32 9
This argument may help explain why incorporated entities are
subject to the double corporate tax and not afforded a choice of entity
classifications, but unless there is good reason to allow business
managers to exploit their agency relationship with shareholders more
than their agency relationship with equity holders in unincorporated
businesses, this argument does not explain why incorporated entities
should be subject to the double corporate tax without any choice as
to tax classification.
Moreover, even under the more benign version of this
explanation for the corporate tax, incorporated entities could still be
given a choice of entity classification. Then, managers and owners
could decide whether capital lock-in is indeed sufficiently valuable
to the enterprise such that it is in the owners' and managers' interests
to protect it with the imposition of the corporate tax.
e. Political Theories
Another explanation for the persistence of the double tax is that
"the corporate tax [is] simply another tax on capital[, and v]oters, in
this view, favor the corporate tax because they believe that the tax
falls on owners of capital; they do not themselves own significant
amounts of capital; and they feel that those who do should be
taxed.""33 Accepting this theory should mandate the imposition of
329. Bank, supra note 301, at 535 (citing Arlen & Weiss, supra note 306, at 336, 348-49).
This explanation is based on the agency relationship between owners and managers regarding
distribution of corporate profits. Another agency explanation for the corporate tax focuses on the
agency relationship between owners and managers regarding the disposition of corporate assets.
Professors Kanda and Levmore argue that the corporate tax actually reduces agency costs that
arise in the context of dispositions of corporate assets because the corporate tax unifies the goal of
the managers and the owners (in that they all face the same corporate tax) whereas a pass-through
tax regime could lead to a situation where a manager-owner makes a decision to defer or
accelerate the disposition of business assets in light of differing tax goals of the owners (who face
different levels of tax as a result of the disposition depending on their individual circumstances).
Hideki Kanda & Saul Levmore, Taxes, Agency Costs, and the Price of Incorporation, 77 VA. L.
REv. 211, 227-34 (1991). Thus, the corporate tax reduces the risk that the manager-owner would
make the disposition decision in a self-interested way. Id. at 232-33. Even under this variation
on the agency theory explanation for the corporate tax, incorporated entities could still be given a
choice of entity classification. If this reduction of agency costs is sufficiently valuable to the
owners, they could cause the entity to elect to be taxed under Subchapter C.
330. Arlen & Weiss, supra note 306, at 331-32 (citations omitted).
Winter 2009] CHECKING IN ON "CHECK-THE-BOX"
the same tax not only on incorporated entities but on all owners of
business capital regardless of the form of business. The CTB
regulations do not do so.
A similar argument offered to explain the double tax is that
"[t]he corporate tax is a politically expedient way of raising revenue
because the public does not understand that it ultimately bears the
burden of the tax."33' Again, this theory fails to explain why this
"hidden tax" should be mandatorily imposed on incorporated entities
while unincorporated entities can elect whether or not to subject
themselves to this tax.
f Regulatory Theory
Some "praise [the corporate tax's] ability to serve as a tool to
regulate the corporation""33 in that changes to the corporate tax can
be used as a tool to reform corporate behavior. There is considerable
doubt, however, as to whether the corporate tax can or should
effectively regulate corporations and thus whether the corporate tax
is justified based on its ability to regulate business.333 Even accepting
the regulatory theory as an explanation for the corporate tax, query
why incorporated entities should be mandatorily subject to such
regulation while most other business entities are subjected to
regulation by the corporate tax only at their option.
g. Progressivity
Another argument for the corporate double tax is that it
increases the progressivity of the tax system334 in that the corporate
tax is effectively a tax on wealthy individuals because corporate
stock is likely to be owned more by wealthy individuals than by
middle or lower income individuals. However, if increasing the tax
burden on the wealthy is the goal of the corporate tax, then the CTB
331. Id. at 332.
332. Bank, supra note 307, at 899; see also Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Corporations, Society, and
the State: A Defense of the Corporate Tax, 90 VA. L. REV. 1193, 1212-50 (2004) (explaining the
evolution of the corporate tax as an effort to "regulate and place limits on the power of corporate
management" and arguing the corporate tax is defensible "as a means to control the excessive
accumulation of power in the hands of corporate management").
333. Bank, supra note 307, at 901.
334. See Chorvat, supra note 320, at 258; see also Rebecca S. Rudnick, Who Should Pay the
Corporate Tax in a Flat Tax World?, 39 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 965, 1066-69 (1989) (explaining
an argument justifying the imposition of a double tax where the first level of tax is not assessed at
the "appropriate" rate).
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election's limitations are completely illogical. In an era of
widespread availability of 401(k)s to taxpayers of various income
strata and private equity funds in which only the wealthiest of
taxpayers can invest,335 progressivity is undermined by mandatorily
imposing the double corporate tax on many of the former
investments and allowing the latter to electively avoid this additional
"progressivity-enhancing" tax.
5. No Choice of Business Tax Regime for
Publicly Traded Partnerships
Certain entities are mandatorily treated as corporations under
Code sections or Treasury regulations other than the CTB
regulations.336 For example, Code section 7704 provides that, if
interests in a partnership are traded on an established securities
market or are readily tradable on a secondary market ("publicly
traded"), the partnership will be taxed as a corporation unless 90
percent or more of the partnership's income is passive-type
income.337 Thus, with limited exceptions, any partnership that is
publicly traded will be taxed as a corporation and will be denied its
choice of business tax regime.
Hence, in order to defend the parameters of the CTB election,
this denial of entity classification choice to publicly traded
partnerships ("PTPs") must be explained; PTPs must be sufficiently
different from other business entities so as to mandate corporate
taxation.338 The publicly traded partnership rules were enacted in an
effort to protect the corporate tax base from erosion by certain
arrangements (considered to be tax shelters), often structured as
limited partnerships with hundreds or thousands of limited partners
holding publicly traded interests.339 Congress viewed these entities
335. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501(a), 230.505-506 (2008) (providing exemptions from
registration under the Securities Act of 1933 for certain offerings to "accredited investors,"
which, for natural persons, generally includes high income and high net worth individuals).
336. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(7) (as amended in 2008). For example, this includes
taxable mortgage pools. I.R.C. § 7701(i) (2008).
337. I.R.C. §§ 7704(a), (c) (2008).
338. Rather than revisiting the theories explaining the corporate tax as in Part IV.B.4 (which
would yield an unsatisfactory explanation, as in Part IV.B.4), this analysis of the denial of entity
classification choice to publicly traded partnerships focuses on features and issues specific to
PTPs.
339. See H.R. REP. NO. 100-391(11) (1987); JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, TAX TREATMENT
OF MASTER LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS, No. JCS- 18-87 (1987).
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as sufficiently resembling corporations34  and as conducting
"activities that would otherwise be conducted in the corporate
form... subject to two levels of tax,""34 thus meriting application of
the double corporate tax.
However, query the continued relevance today of this
explanation for imposing the double corporate tax on these entities.
While these PTPs do earn income from active businesses, the
existence of an active business cannot be the distinguishing factor in
determining whether an entity is mandatorily subject to corporate
taxation or whether the entity is afforded a choice of classifications;
active businesses are regularly conducted in LLCs, limited
partnerships and general partnerships, all of which have discretion to
choose their tax classification under the CTB regulations.34
The crux of the issue seems to be the existence of "public
trading," '343 and a theory behind the publicly traded partnership rules
may be that the double corporate tax is a fee for access to the public
financial markets.3" However, this attempted explanation fails for a
number of reasons. First, as discussed above, the corporate income
tax is not generally viewed as the cost of benefits conferred, and
even if it were, measuring the value of that benefit conferred would
be extremely difficult.345 Second, the public trading explanation for
the mandatory imposition of corporate tax is both underinclusive and
overinclusive given that many entities are mandatorily subject to the
corporate tax even though their interests are not publicly traded (e.g.,
privately held corporations) and given that a number of entities have
340. See H.R. REP. NO. 100-391(11) (1987).
341. Id.
342. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, TREASURY CONFERENCE ON BUSINESS TAXATION AND
GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS, BACKGROUND PAPER 12-15 (2007), available at
http://www.treasury.gov/press/releases/reports/07230%20r.pdf (noting that unincorporated
businesses represent a significant portion of active business activity in the United States).
Moreover, there are many similarities among the types of businesses that are conducted in
incorporated entities and unincorporated entities; there is significant overlap among the industries
in which corporations and partnerships are engaged. See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note
121, at 17-18.
343. Cf A.L.I., TAXATION OF PRIVATE BUSINESS ENTERPRISE, supra note 160
(differentiating between private and public businesses, and only discussing the taxation of private
business).
344. See Yin, supra note 87, at 132; see also Rudnick, supra note 334, at 1082-93, 1098,
1172-86 (arguing that the imposition of an additional layer of tax on public companies is
appropriate based on benefits theory, ability-to-pay theory, and optimal tax theory grounds).
345. See Yin, supra note 87, at 132; see also Maine, supra note 313.
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a choice of entity classification despite the fact that their interests are
publicly traded (e.g., The Blackstone Group L.P. and Fortress
Investment Group LLC).346 Third, query why businesses that access
capital from a wide array of investors through the public markets
should be put at a competitive disadvantage in comparison to
businesses that are able to access enough capital from larger private
investors with fewer liquidity concerns. 47 Fourth, while optimal tax
theory may suggest that revenue can be raised efficiently by
imposing a higher tax burden on entities that have relatively inelastic
features like public trading, the imposition of a higher tax still affects
the price that investors are willing to pay for publicly traded stock,
and the demand for access to capital through the public markets
becomes more elastic as more companies are able to raise capital in
the private markets. 48
Alternatively, as was suggested by the Treasury Department
when the publicly traded partnership rules were originally
proposed,' it may not be public trading per se that that explains why
publicly traded entities are mandatorily taxed as corporations, but
rather the fact that the existence of public trading is indicative of
other corporate characteristics like limited liability,35 °  free
transferability of interests, centralized management, and continuity
of life.35' Thus, mandatory taxation as a corporation would be
merited either because these publicly traded entities resemble
346. See, e.g., supra note 316. There have been some proposals to eliminate the availability
of the qualifying income exception to corporate taxation for publicly traded partnerships where
the partnership receives income from specified investment advice or asset management activities.
See, e.g., S. 1624, 110th Cong. (2007). This would limit the ability of partnerships to have their
interests publicly traded while avoiding taxation as a corporation. Id.
347. See generally A.L.I., TAXATION OF PRIVATE BUSINESS ENTERPRISE, supra note 160, at
59.
348. See supra Part IV.B.4.c.
349. Issues Relating to Pass-Through Entities: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Select
Revenue Measures of the Comm. on Ways and Means, 99th Cong. 7, 31 (1986) (Statement of J.
Roger Metz, Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy, Dep't of the Treasury) (explaining that the
proposal of § 7704 "is not based on the view that publicly traded limited partnerships are different
in kind from all other partnerships, but on the view that public trading in the interests of a limited
partnership is indicative of the existence of the other, more relevant, classification factors").
350. Some scholars argue that it is limited liability that actually makes public trading
possible. See Maine, supra note 313, at 251. Accordingly, levying an additional tax charge on
publicly traded entities is tantamount to levying the additional charge on the benefit of limited
liability. Nevertheless, limited liability is valuable for non-public companies too, so query why
those companies should escape the extra tax levy if the concept is that the corporate tax imposes
an additional charge on the benefit of limited liability. See id. at 253-54.
351. See A.L.I., TAXATION OF PRIVATE BUSINESS ENTERPRISE, supra note 160, at 58.
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corporations or as a tax charge on the provision of the benefit
conferred by one or more of these characteristics. However, the
adoption of the CTB regulations explicitly rejected the use of these
corporate resemblance factors in determining how a business entity
should be taxed, so implicitly reincorporating these resemblance
factors through the publicly traded partnership rules seems contrary
to the stated rationale behind the CTB regulations. 52  Further,
viewing the mandatory imposition of the corporate tax as a levy on
these benefits runs counter to the notion that the income tax is
generally not a tax in exchange for benefits conferred, and moreover,
many other business entities possess these beneficial characteristics
but are afforded a choice of entity classification. 53
One other explanation for treating publicly traded entities
differently from privately held entities is the concern that the
recordkeeping burden and the administration of a pass-through
taxation regime would be unwieldy and inefficient for entities that
are publicly traded. The Treasury explains that generally
conditioning access to the public capital markets on the use of an
entity taxed as a corporation "may be of practical administrative
importance, since the IRS need not depend on accurate filing by
potentially thousands of partners whose interests may be constantly
changing through public trading (and some of whom may be tax-
exempt or foreign), nor must the IRS separately deal with each of
these partners to collect any taxes due." '354 While some entities that
are taxed as partnerships do have interests that are publicly traded,355
administrability is a compelling concern. Nevertheless, this concern
could be mitigated if such publicly traded entities took advantage of
the simplified flow-through regime and reporting requirements for
electing large partnerships,356 which would reduce the recordkeeping
352. Moreover, public trading really reflects free transferability of economic interests, but the
Kintner regulations looked to free transferability of governance interests, so the public trading
explanation is an imperfect fit, even with the pre-CTB analysis. See id.
353. See supra Part IV.B.4.b.
354. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, TAX REFORM: SELECTED FEDERAL TAX ISSUES RELATING
TO SMALL BUSINESS AND CHOICE OF ENTITY, No. JCX-48-08, at 43 (2008). The administrability
concern may be particularly compelling in specific situations, for example, where there are
complex Code section 704(c) issues involving contributed property.
355. See The Blackstone Group L.P., supra note 216; Fortress Investment Group LLC, supra
note 216. Given the relatively recent IPOs of Fortress Investments, LLC, and The Blackstone
Group, L.P., it may be too early to determine the extent of the problems of tax administration
caused by these types of entities. See supra note 316.
356. I.R.C. §§ 771-777 (1998). However, given the differences between the regular
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and administration burdens. Further, partnership recordkeeping and
administration is complicated for a number of reasons, and
partnerships that have publicly traded interests are not necessarily
more complicated (and thus more deserving of mandatory taxation as
corporations) than other partnerships with complex special
allocations, multiple classes of interests, significant amounts of
contributed property, and frequent transfers of partnership interests
and/or assets. Even with these complications, such partnerships are
allowed to choose their entity classification. Moreover, even if
administrability is an overriding concern meriting taxation at the
entity level, query why these entities should be subject to extra
taxation; taxation at the entity level need not necessarily imply
double taxation as long as there is a way to integrate the corporate-
level and shareholder-level taxes.
As with incorporated entities, the Treasury was powerless to
allow elective entity classification for publicly traded partnerships. 57
Given that the CTB regulations were constrained by the existing
statutory provisions, any regulations regarding entity classification
could not undo either the double tax regime in general or corporate
tax treatment for publicly traded partnerships. However, while the
statutory limitations explain how it came to be that the current entity
classification rules mandatorily tax publicly traded partnerships as
corporations, the foregoing arguments attempting to explain why
publicly traded partnerships are mandatorily classified as
corporations struggle to explain why such entities should be treated
differently than other business entities. Further, as with incorporated
entities, this limitation on the availability of the CTB election is not
neutral; although public trading is a relatively inelastic feature of
business,358 denying publicly traded partnerships the ability to choose
their entity classification could distort their decisions as to how and
from whom to obtain capital.
partnership regime and the regime for electing large partnerships ("ELPs"), there may be a
strategic component to a partnership's decision whether or not to elect to be treated as an ELP.
See generally ARTHUR B. WILLIS ET AL., PARTNERSHIP TAXATION 9.01[19] (2008) (explaining
several ways in which the tax rules for ELPs differ from the tax rules applicable to partnerships in
general, many of which may impact a partnership's decision whether or not to elect treatment as
an ELP).
357. See supra notes 295-296 and accompanying text.
358. See Yin, supra note 87, at 132-33.
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6. Evaluation of the CTB Election
in Light of Its Limitations
While some limitations on the availability of the CTB election
advance the goals of the explicitly elective classification system for
the taxation of business entities, it is hard, in some situations, to draw
a substantive, theoretically coherent distinction between where the
CTB election is allowed and where it is not. Moreover, treating
incorporated entities differently than unincorporated entities for tax
purposes and, to a lesser extent, treating publicly traded entities
differently than privately held entities for tax purposes creates the
same kind of distortion of economic choices (between using different
entities) that the CTB election purported to eliminate. 59 The lack of
coherence in the boundaries of the CTB election undermines the
provision of choice to those entities for which choice is allowed.
Incorporated entities and publicly traded entities are "virtually
indistinguishable" from other business entities, at least based on
factors that have meaningful tax policy import, and hence, all
business entities should be classified in the same manner. Ideally,
the regimes for taxing businesses would be unified, and absent that,
either all such business entities should be afforded a choice of tax
classification among the multiple regimes or all such business
entities should be denied the choice.
Unfortunately, progress on these issues may be hindered by the
existence of the CTB regulations themselves. By claiming that it had
sufficient authority to promulgate an elective entity classification
system and promulgating the CTB regulations in response to the
substantial flaws of the Kintner regulations, the Treasury lost the
opportunity to encourage Congress to step in. Had the Treasury
concluded that it lacked the authority to implement the CTB regime
(as many commentators have suggested),36 Congress may have
reconsidered the multi-regime system for taxing business or, at the
very least, entertained a more consistent approach to determining
which business entities are subject to which business tax regimes.361
Instead, the Treasury was forced to accept the flawed multi-regime
system for taxing business and was limited to designing an entity
classification system bound by the statutory limitations of the
359. See supra notes 92, 115, 165, 166, 358 and accompanying text.
360. See supra note 108.
361. Admittedly, this is rather optimistic.
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definition of "corporation" in Code section 7701(a)(3) and the
publicly traded partnership rules of Code section 7704. Thus, the
incoherence of the limitations on the elective entity classification
system became unavoidable when the Treasury assumed the
responsibility of fixing the entity classification regime in the mid-
1990s. Now, even if the Treasury concludes that the entity
classification system is hopelessly flawed without Congressional
action,362 Congress may be reluctant to accept an invitation to fix the
entity classification system and multi-regime business tax system
because the problems with these systems may be less compelling (at
least to taxpayers) than they were in the 1990s when there was an
explosion of LLCs and when there were higher tax rates applicable
to dividends and capital gains.
V. CONCLUSION
The CTB regulations represent an improvement over the Kintner
regulations, at least for domestic entities. However, the last twelve
years have shown that the CTB regulations are far from a panacea for
all that ailed the entity classification process, even for domestic
entities. Some complexity remains. Other complications were
created by the new regime. Transaction costs have not been reduced
as much as they could be. The benefits of flexibility in structuring
business operations and transactions, while increasing the neutrality
of the tax system, may be too much of a good thing, possibly causing
inefficiency (deadweight loss arising from tax planning, particularly
with foreign entities), harming the fisc, and failing to address
inequities (e.g., that benefits are still available more for the taxpayers
who can afford the most sophisticated advice). Further, a careful
look at the dimensions of the CTB election reveals discrepancies
between the goals of the CTB election and the election's scope,
which undermine the existence of the election itself.
These infirmities inherent in the CTB regulations put additional
pressure on the fundamental question that lurks behind this entire
analysis: why are there multiple regimes for taxing businesses?
There has been a tremendous amount of writing on this issue, most
of which condemns the multi-regime system and argues for some
sort of corporate integration.363 This Article does not attempt to
362. This Article lends support to this view.
363. See, e.g., A.L.I., TAXATION OF PRIVATE BUSINESS ENTERPRISE, supra note 160; A.L.I.,
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rehash that debate, nor does this Article advocate for any particular
model for taxing business (Subchapter C, K, or S or any particular
approach to corporate integration). However, the foregoing analysis
demonstrates that many of the remaining policy weaknesses facing
the entity classification system stem largely from the existence of the
multi-regime system. The CTB regulations themselves may
exacerbate this problem because, although policymakers starting
anew are unlikely to choose our multi-regime system for taxing
business entities with its various eligibility rules and limited-
availability elections, the promulgation of the CTB regulations
bridged part of the gap between the multiple different business tax
regimes, possibly reducing the impetus for Congress to take the next
step in the journey that created our current rules governing the
taxation of businesses.
So now, even if the scope of the election is modified and the
elective rules are made mandatory, little progress would be made
because it is the continued existence of multiple regimes for taxing
businesses that perpetuates much of the complexity, administrability,
cost, efficiency, and equity problems discussed herein. As long as
partnerships are taxed as conduits, corporations are subject to an
entity-level tax, and conduit and entity taxation continue to produce
significantly different tax results, any taxpayer forming or operating
a business must analyze the different regimes and determine which
regime provides better tax consequences. The need for this analysis
complicates business planning, forces taxpayers to incur otherwise
unnecessary transaction costs, results in a possibly inefficient
allocation of resources, disadvantages taxpayers with less
knowledge, sophistication and/or wealth, and means that the income
tax still wields influence over taxpayers' business decisions
regarding choice of entity. Further, it is the absence of a strong
normative argument in favor of each of the federal income tax's
multiple regimes for taxing businesses that makes it so difficult to
INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE INCOME TAX, supra note 248; U.S. DEP'T
OF THE TREASURY, supra note 248; PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL ON FEDERAL TAX REFORM,
SIMPLE, FAIR, AND PRO-GROWTH: PROPOSALS TO FIX AMERICA'S TAX SYSTEM ch. 5, at 94-100
(2005); Hamill, The LLC, supra note 54, at n.19 (collecting citations of articles debating the
integration issue); Klein & Zolt, supra note 97; Kleinbard, supra note 261; Jeffrey L. Kwall,
Taxing Private Enterprise in the New Millennium, 51 TAX LAW. 229 (1998); Lawrence Lokken,
Taxation of Private Business Firms: Imagining a Future Without Subchapter K, 4 FLA. TAX REV.
249 (1999); Yin, supra note 87.
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justify the denial of entity classification choice to incorporated
entities and publicly traded partnerships. Without affirmative,
principled theories defending each regime (and particularly the
corporate double tax) and the differences between the regimes, it
becomes almost futile to argue why certain entities should be
mandatorily subject to one regime or another while other entities are
allowed to select their applicable regime. Thus, checking in on the
check-the-box regulations suggests not only that improvements could
still be made to the entity classification system, but it also
underscores a fundamental problem with the continued existence of
multiple business tax regimes among which taxpayers can choose,
thus adding to the arguments in favor of reforming the manner in
which businesses are taxed.
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APPENDIX A
ENTITY CLASSIFICATION ELECTIONS3"
CALENDAR YEARS 1997-2007
Figure 1: Entity Classification Elections
Total Number of Elections per Calendar Year for Domestic and
Foreign Entities
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Calendar Year
-4- Domestic -U- Foreign
364. I.R.S. Statistics of Income Division (June 2008) (unpublished data on file with author).
With respect to all information reflected in Figures 1, 2, and 3 in this Appendix A, note that 2007
data is preliminary, that the counts include Form 8832s processed by Statistics of Income through
June 2008, that the counts only include filings with valid and complete information, and that
calendar year counts are based on the election date reported by the taxpayer and any corrections
made by the Internal Revenue Service at the time of filing relative to the filing requirements.
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Figure 2: Domestic Entity Classification Elections
Number of Elections by Domestic Entities per Calendar Year, by
Tax Classification Elected (Corporate, Disregarded Entity, or
Partnership), and by Timing of Election (Change in Status or Initial
Election)
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Calendar Year
-4-Domestic -Corp -Change AF-Domestic - Corp -Initial
-*-Domestic - DE -Change -*-Domestic - DE - Initial
-*-Domestic - Pshp -Change -#-Domestic - Pshp - Initial
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Figure 3: Foreign Entity Classification Elections
Number of Elections by Foreign Entities per Calendar Year, by Tax
Classification Elected (Corporate, Disregarded Entity, or
Partnership), and by Timing of Election (Change in Status or Initial
Election)
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